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The Hidden Costs of Strategic
Communications for the International
Criminal Court
MEGAN A. FAIRLIE*
ABSTRACT
In little more than a decade, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has more
than 11,500 requests for its Prosecutor to conduct atrocity investigations around the
globe. To date, no such communication has resulted in an official investigation.
Nevertheless, the act of publicizing these investigation requests has proven to be an
effective attention-getting tool that can achieve valuable alternative goals. This fact
explains the increasing popularity of "strategic communications" -highly publicized
investigation requests aimed not at securing any ICC-related activity, but at obtaining
some non-Court related advantage. This Article, which is the first to identify this
trend, explains why the international legal community has accepted the instrumental
use of the ICC's communication process with little reflection. It demonstrates why this
tolerance is unwise by identifying the potential costs of strategic communications. It
then establishes the significance of these concerns by illustrating the specific costs
created by the most widely publicized communication to date: The call for the ICC
Prosecutor to investigate Pope Benedict XVI for crimes against humanity of sexual
violence.
The goal of this Article is to encourage the international legal community to
revisit its unexamined acceptance of strategic communications. This can lead to a
debate that, at a minimum, should prompt Court supporters -specifically civil society
members-to think carefully before engaging in conduct that creates dangerous
consequences for the ICC.
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INTRODUCTION
In September 2011, a widely disseminated press release appeared with the
headline "Clergy Sex Victims File an International Criminal Court Complaint: Case
Charges Vatican Officials with 'Crimes against Humanity."" Predictably, the release
generated a flurry of media attention, including news coverage with equally eye-
catching titles, such as "Child abuse victims sue Pope for crimes against humanity"2
1. Press Release, Survivors Network for those Abused by Priests, Clergy Sex Victims File
International Criminal Court Complaint Case Charges Vatican Officials with 'Crimes against Humanity'
(Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/249581\snap-hague-filing-press-release-
english.pdf [hereinafter First September 2011 Press Release].
2. Child Abuse Victims Sue Pope for Crimes Against Humanity, DAILY NATION (Sept. 13, 2011),
http://www.nation.co.ke/News/world/Child+abuse+victims+sue+Pope+for+crimes+against+humanity++/-
/1068/1235856/-/1277ncn/-/index.html. For other examples, see generally Pope Sued for Alleged Crimes
Against Humanity, VOICE OF AMERICA (Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.voanews.com/content/pope-sued-for-
alleged-crimes-against-humanity-129731318/170867.html; Karen McVeigh, Pope Benedict Resigns: Sex
Abuse Survivors Hope Move Eases Prosecution, GUARDIAN9 (Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.gi.iaiiqn rn uk!
world/2014/feb/11/pope-resignss-sex- abuse-survivors.
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and "Case Against Pope Filed Before International Criminal Court."' In reality,
however, there never was such a case. Rather, the International Criminal Court
Prosecutor had simply been asked to consider the possibility of opening an
investigation into the matter through a mechanism that is incredibly popular, available
to anyone, and profoundly unlikely to result in an International Criminal Court
prosecution. Indeed, provocative headlines notwithstanding, retired Pope Benedict
XVI is not now, nor has he ever been, charged with crimes against humanity in any
court.
Nevertheless, by creating the impression of an ICC case, the Vatican-targeted
campaign succeeded in attracting significant media attention and enhancing worldwide
awareness of the horrific betrayal of the Catholic Church's most vulnerable members.
As a result, the effort appears to be a masterful exercise in what this Article dubs
"strategic communications" -highly publicized investigation requests aimed not at
securing any ICC-related activity, but at obtaining some non-Court related advantage.
What is more, the effort appears to have inspired a broader and generally overlooked
trend towards publicizing ICC investigation requests. The appeal of the technique is
obvious; much good can come from directing international attention to the many
unthinkable atrocities taking place around the globe. But are strategic
communications good for the International Criminal Court? This Article addresses
this important question. In so doing, it demonstrates why Court supporters-
specifically civil society members-ought to think carefully before using investigation
requests as attention-getting tools.
I. BACKGROUND
In the short life of the International Criminal Court, the ICC's Office of the
Prosecutor (OTP) has received more than 11,500 requests to conduct atrocity
investigations around the globe.' Requests are accepted pursuant to Article 15 of the
Court's Statute,' and OTP's policy-subject to very limited exceptions-is to keep
both the requests and subsequent analyses private. Ostensibly, this approach is
designed to "protect the confidentiality of senders, the confidentiality of information
submitted and the integrity of analysis or investigation."' At the same time, however,
nothing prevents those making the requests (information providers) from publicizing
the "communications" 7 they send to the Court. In fact, it has become increasingly
3. Case Against Pope Filed Before International Criminal Court, Ms. MAG. (Sept. 14, 2011),
http://msmagazine.comlnews/uswirestory.asp?id=13220.
4. THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, REPORT ON PRELIMINARY
EXAMINATION AcrrVITIEs 2015 para. 18 (2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-PE-rep-2015-
Eng.pdf (stating that between July 1, 2002, the date when the Statute establishing the International Criminal
Court (ICC) entered into force, and October 31, 2015, the Office of the Prosecutor received 11,519
communications).
5. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 15, July 17, 1988, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
6. TI OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, UPDATE ON COMMUNICATIONS
RECEIVED BY THE OFFICE OF TIfHE PROSECUTOR Or TIE ICC (2006), http://www.icc cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/
F596DO8D-D810-43A2-99BBB899B9C5BCD2/277421/OTPFUpdate-on Communications_10_February
2006.pdf [hereinafter UPDATE ON COMMUNICATIONS].
7. See WILLIAM A. SCIADAS, TIHE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY ON THE
ROME STATUTE 320 (2010) ("The Office of the Prosecutor has adopted the term 'communications' to
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popular for lawyers and human rights groups to disseminate press releases and hold
press briefings in conjunction with their requests for ICC investigations.8 To date,
there has been little commentary on this practice, irrespective of whether a request
constitutes "a serious legal bid" or instead appears to be "based on a desire for
publicity rather than any expectation of prosecution." 9
This reception aligns with the increasing use (and acceptance) of strategic human
rights litigation, a practice that uses "courts as forums for protest",o by initiating cases
with important aims "beyond winning."n Indeed, well-publicized communications are
describe information provided on the basis of article 15.").
8. E.g., Angelos Anastasiou, MEP Seeks ICC Action Against Turkey, CYPRUS MAIL (July 12, 2014),
http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/07/12/mep-seeks-icc-action-against-turkey/ (quoting from a press release issued
by Cypriots Against Turkish War Crimes regarding the "complaint" they planned to file against Turkey);
Complaint Filed at International Criminal Court over NATO Allies' Complicity in US Drone Strikes,
REPRIEVE (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.reprieve.org.uk/press/2014 02_19_complaintinternational court_
drones/; Press Release, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, NGOs Submit Evidence to ICC on Crimes Against
Humanity and Impunity in Honduras, Call on Court to Take Up Case (Nov. 15, 2012),
http://ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-releases/ngos-submit-evidence-icc-crimes-against-humanity-and-
impunity-honduras,-call-court-take-case; Press Release, European Ctr. for Constitutional and Human
Rights, The International Criminal Court Must Investigate UK Military Abuses Against Iraqi Detainees
from 2003 to 2008 as War Crimes (Jan. 10, 2014), http://www.ecchr.eu/tl_files/Dokumente/Universelle%
20JustizlUK-ICC,%2OPress%20Release,%202014-01-10.pdf; Press Release, Int'l Fed'n for Human Rights
Glob. Diligence LLP, Richard Rogers of Global Diligence LLP Files an Article 15 Communication at the
International Criminal Court (Oct. 7,2014), http://www.globaldiligence.com/global-diligence-file-article-15-
communication-international-criminal-court/; Press Release, Martin Secrett, 9 Bedford Row Int'l, 9 Bedford
Row International Submits Article 15 Communication to the ICC Prosecutor in Respect of Bangladesh
(Feb. 4, 2014), http://9bri.com/press-release-9-bedford-row-international-submits-article-15-
communication-to-the-icc-prosecutor-in-respect-of-bangladesh/.
9. Toby Cadman, Why I'm Taking the Bangladesh Prime Minister to the International Criminal Court,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/toby-cadman/bangladesh-b-
5017421.html (describing the Bangladesh filing as one of the former). Admittedly, this latter description is
more expansive than the definition adopted above for strategic communications. For example, one might
convincingly argue that the Article 15 communication addressing the conduct of UK officers in Iraq was
filed without the expectation of an ICC prosecution. Assuming arguendo that this is so, however, provides
no indication that the aim of the communication was to secure a non-ICC-related advantage. Rather, the
communication prompted a preliminary examination at the ICC which has incentivized greater steps
towards accountability at the national level. See David Bosco, A Court on the Rocks? Responding to the
Rough Justice Reviews, JAMES G. STEWART (Mar. 10, 2015), http://jamesgstewart.com/a-court-on-the-rocks-
responding-to-the-rough-justice-reviews/ ("The OTP reopened a preliminary examination of British
conduct in Iraq, and in so doing it forced the UK authorities to examine much more thoroughly its national
accountability procedures."). In other words, the UK-Iraq filing promoted the ICC objective of positive
complementarity. See, e.g., THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, PROSECUTORIAL
STRATEGY 2009-2012, para. 16 (2010), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/66A8DCDC-3650-4514-
AA62-D229D1128F65/281506/OTPProsecutorialStrategy20092013.pdf (describing "posIive
complementarity" as "a proactive policy of cooperation aimed at promoting national proceedings" such that
intervention by the Office of the Prosecutor is exceptional). For a recent example of the policy in practice,
see Saliou Samb, Guinea's Ex-Junta Leader Indicted Over Stadium Massacre, REUTERS (July 9, 2015),
http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKCNOPJOM220150709 (describing a domestic indictment issued
in the wake of the ICC Prosecutor's visit to the country).
10. Jules Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest, 52 UCLA L. REV. 477, 479 (2004) [hereinafter Lobel,
Courts as Forums]. See also Wolfgang Kaleck, From Pinochet to Rumsfeld: Universal Jurisdiction in Europe
1998-2008, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 927, 976-77 (2009) (describing strategic litigation as "a fairly new concept
in continental Europe" and as a means to achieve a myriad of extra-judicial outcomes, while also considering
its limitations and opportunities).
11. JULES LOBEL, SUCCESS WITHOUT VICTORY: LOST LEGAL BATrLES AND THE LONG ROAD TO
JUSTICE IN AMERICA 193 (2003) (discussing a complaint brought to "publicize illegal conduct by the U.S.
and El Salvadoran governments").
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poised to achieve valuable goals virtually identical to those of their litigation
counterparts,1 2 such as educating the international community about gross human
rights violations" and mobilizing public opinion against harmful government policies."
This instrumental use of the ICC may even seem fitting, as the Court is itself a product
of the international human rights movement.1 5 At the same time, however, strategic
litigation and strategic communications are not entirely analogous. Rather, as some
critics have begun to recognize, strategic communications cieate ceitain risks fot a less
established institution like the ICC.16
Because non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are frequently behind (or
supportive of) Article 15 communications," this Article first explains the unique
relationship between civil society and the Court. In so doing, it establishes why
members of this group are likely to have a vested interest in the long-term success of
the ICC. This Article then identifies some of the possible costs associated with highly
publicized investigation requests and illustrates why strategic communications in
particular have the potential to undermine that interest. Finally, it evaluates the
specific costs created by what is likely the most widely publicized communication to
date: The call for the ICC Prosecutor to investigate and prosecute Pope Benedict XVI
and senior-level Vatican officials "for rape and other forms of sexual violence as crimes
against humanity."" In examining this request, this Article illustrates how the
communication gives false credence to certain pre-operational criticisms of the Court
made popular in the United States, including arguments that the Court's provision on
crimes against humanity is overly broad and that unfounded ICC charges can easily be
brought at the behest of NGOs. It then demonstrates how the recent rejection of the
communication" contributes to some of the post-operational criticisms of the Court,
12. See Lobel, Courts as Forums, supra note 10, at 560 ("[Mlovement attorneys should realize that
litigation and publicity should go together hand in hand as part of an overall strategy that will result in
eventual success, even if that success is temporarily delayed by defeats in the courts.").
13. See Jules Lobel, Losers, Fools & Prophets: Justice as Struggle, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1331, 1393-94
(1995) ("[A]n important part of the lawsuit was educating the public about the atrocities occurring in El
Salvador.").
14. See Lobel, Courts as Forums, supra note 10, at 557 (discussing litigation that was used "as part of a
broader political movement against the administration's antiterrorism policies").
15. SCHABAS, supra note 7, at 397.
16. See, e.g., Lauren Crothers, Hun Sen Accused of Genocide in ICC Complaint, CAMBODIA DAILY
(Mar. 21, 2014), https://www.cambodiadaily.comlarchives/hun-sen accused of genocide in ice complaint
54669/ (quoting the Executive Director of the Cambodian Defenders' Project's assessment of a request
made by human rights groups for the ICC Prosecutor to investigate the current Cambodian Prime Minister
and others, stating that "I think that we must use the ICC very carefully, otherwise it will lose value and lose
the confidence in the court"); Michael G. Karnavas, Just How Relevant is the ICC: A Viable Court of Last
Resort - or - A Politicized Court of Low Expectations? 30-31 (Feb. 26, 2014) (unpublished manuscript),
http://michaelgkarnavas.net/files/ICCBrownLecture_26Febl4.pdf (expressing concern over the use of the
communication process by one political party as a "pretext to score politically against" another).
17. See, e.g., SCHABAS, supra note 7, at 320 (noting that "individuals and non-governmental
organizations" are the "primary sources" of Article 15 communications).
18. Letter from Pamela C. Specs & Katherine Gallagher, Senior Staff Attorneys, Ctr. for Constitutional
Rights, to Luis Moreno Ocampo, Prosecutor, Int'l Criminal Court (May 19, 2011), https://ccrjustice.org/
sites/default/files/assets/Survivors%20Network%20Art%20%2015%20Communication%2Oto%20ICC%2
OOTP%20(3).pdf [hereinafter Communication Letter].
19. Letter from M.P. Dillon, Head of the Info. & Evidence Unit, Office of the Prosecutor, in reference
to OTP CR 159/11 (May 31, 2013), http://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/snap/pages/795/attachments/
original/1372188351/ICCletterfromProsecution.pdf?1372188351 [hereinafter Rejection Letter]
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such as its perceived anti-Africa bias, tendency to exempt the politically powerful, and
failure to adequately pursue crimes of sexual violence. Positing that these damaging
consequences for the Court are unintentional, this piece illustrates why global civil
society actors interested in the ICC's long-term success should carefully evaluate the
potential for harm before engaging in the practice of strategic communications.
II. CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE ICC
Defined empirically to include those persons and organizations that have
vocalized their opinions about the Court, the term "global civil society" captures an
incredibly broad swath of actors with unquestionably divergent interests.' Narrowing
this field to those members most likely to avail themselves of the strategic
communication option-victims' organizations, international and local human rights
groups, and the lawyers who represent them-still results in a collection of players
whose goals and interests are exceedingly varied. Nevertheless, because these actors
played a key role in the creation of the Court,21 it stands to reason that many in this
pool have a vested interest in the ICC's long-term success or, at the very least, a
disinclination to act in a way that endaugeis the support necessary for its survival.
Indeed, if anything, the relationship between global civil society and the ICC is
one of ever-increasing engagement, a trajectory that began even prior to the Court's
formation. An important barometer in this regard lies in the growing number of NGOs
that have partnered to form the Coalition for the International Criminal Court
(CICC). Starting with merely twenty-five member organizations in 1995,2 the CICC
grew to have more than 300 members actively preparing for the establishment of the
Court.2 By the time that the ICC Statute was negotiated in Rome in the summer of
1998, this number had nearly tripled.2 4  Membership then stretched to over 1000
organizations after the Statute was signed, a number that has essentially doubled since
the Court became operational 5
As these numbers have grown, so has the connection between civil society and
the Court. After the "coordinated lobbying" that preceded the meeting in Rome, the
CICC proved indispensable to the successful negotiations of the ICC Statute,26 as
(responding to the May 2011 letter from Pamela Spees and determining that "there is not a basis at this time
to proceed with further analysis").
20. Glasius adopts this definition, capturing a diverse group of actors such as tribal and religious leaders,
rcocarchors, aid workers, and journalists. Marlies Glasius, What Is Global Justice and Who Decides? Civil
Society and Victim Responses to the International Criminal Court's First Investigations, 31 HuM. RTS. Q. 496,
497 (2009) [hereinafter Glasius, What Is Global Justice].
21. See generally MARLIES GLASIUS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A GLOBAL CIVIL
SOCIETY ACHIEVEMENT (2006) [hereinafter GLASIUS, GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY].
22. Our History, COAL. FOR INT'L CRIM. COURT, http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=cicchistory (last visited
Feb. 28, 2016).
23. Christopher Keith Hall, The Fifth Session of the UN Preparatory Committee on the Establishment
of the International Criminal Court, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 331, 339 (1998) (noting the "increasing effectiveness
of the coordinated lobbying" of the Coalition for the International Criminal Court's (CICC's) then 316
members).
24. See GLASIUs, GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 21, at 27 (noting that more than a quarter of the
over 800 organizations sent in- person reproontativoc for the Statute's negotiations in Rome).
25. Our History, supra note 22.
26. Leila Nadya Sadat, The International Criminal Court 4-5 (Wash. Univ. in St. Louis Sch. of Law
I egal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No 14-05-02, 2014) (descrihing the CICC as "powerful" and its
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NGOs "played a crucial role in shaping the content of emerging norms." 2 7 In fact, the
CICC's contributions to the Court's creation were specifically acknowledged by the
Chair of the Statute's drafting committee as "important and useful,"28 and included
generating ideas, advising delegates, and influencing political leaders.2 9 Among the
NGO-generated ideas was the concept -ultimately adopted-that the Court should
have an independent prosecutor with the power to begin investigations on the office's
own initiative (proprio motu), rather than limiting the Court's docket to referrals from
the UN Security Council and Member States.30
As a testament to the critical role played by the CICC in the Court's formation,
the ICC's Assembly of States Parties (ASP) later passed a resolution that expressly
recognized the Coalition's important contributions to the establishment of the Court."
By that time, the NGOs of the CICC had concentrated their efforts towards a universal
ratification campaign designed to promote worldwide acceptance of the Court.3 2
When the campaign surpassed its goal of obtaining sixty ratifications by July 2002,"
then-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressly "thank[ed] the many non-
governmental organizations whose tireless efforts contributed to this success."
Notably, the ties that bind civil society and the Court have remained equally
strong throughout the ICC's operation. In keeping with the precedent set at Rome,
civil society has consistently participated in the subsequent meetings of the ICC's
ASP.35 In so doing, it has continued to highlight issues of concern and engage in
important advocacy measures, including pressuring States Parties to nominate better-
qualified judicial candidates. 6 Civil society has also played an active role in
contributing to the Court's ongoing work, such as by serving as amici curiae in its
input as one of five factors without which "[t]he negotiations would undoubtedly have failed").
27. MICHAEL J. STRUETT, THE POLITICS OF CONSTRUCTING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
NGOs, DISCOURSE, AND AGENCY 157 (2008).
28. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT 132
(3d ed. 2008).
29. Id.
30. See STRUETT, supra note 27, at 111 (noting that the NGOs sagely credited the States that advanced
this proposal with having come up with the idea); WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 177 (4th ed. 2011) (describing the proprio motu prosecutor as one of
the "battle cries" of the NGOs).
31. Int'l Criminal Court Assembly of States Parties [ASP], Recognition of the Coordinating and
Facilitating Role of the NGO Coalition for the International Criminal Court, at 1, ICC-ASP/2/Res.8 (Sept.
11, 2003), http://www.icc-cpi.intliccdocs/asp-docs/Resolutions/ICC-ASP-ASP2-Res-08-ENG.pdf.
32. Mariacarmen Colitti, The Experience of No Peace Without Justice, in CIVIL SOCIETY,
INTERNATIONAL COURTS, AND COMPLIANCE BODIES 107, 108 (Tullio Treves et al. eds., 2005).
33. Ved P. Nanda, The Contribution of Non-Governmental Organizations in Strengthening and Shaping
International Human Rights Law: The Successful Drives to Ban Landmines and to Create an International
Criminal Court, 19 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DISP. RESOL. 256,282-83 (2011).
34. . Press Release, Secretary-General, Transcript of Press Conference with President Carlo Ciampi
of Italy and Secretary-General Kofi Annan in Rome and New York by Videoconference, U.N. Press Release
SG/SM18194 (Apr. 11, 2002).
35. . Scc, c.g., Gabricla Augustfnyoyd & Aiste Dumbryte, The Indispensable Role of Non
Governmental Organizations in the Creation and Functioning of the International Criminal Court, 5 CZECH
Y.B. INT'L L. 39, 51 (noting the active role played by NGOs at ASP meetings).
36. . Id.
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proceedings37 and supplementing the ICC's outreach efforts.38 The Court has even
benefitted from gender training for its staff courtesy of the Women's Initiative for
Gender Justice,3 9 an organization the current Prosecutor expressly thanked while
acknowledging the "crucial role civil society plays" in assisting the Court in addressing
crimes of sexual violence." Members of civil society even feature prominently in the
latest, most comprehensive book on ICC practice 41 and are at the forefront of the effort
lo hold Stales Part ies to their obligur i im to honor and execute ICC arrest warrants.42
III. LEGITIMACY AND ITS CHALLENGES
Given these and other significant contributions to the creation, development and
operation of the ICC, it is little wonder that NGOs have come to be viewed as
"indispensable" to the institution 3 and that the organizations involved have come to
feel that they have "a stake in the legitimacy of the Court."" Having influenced
important aspects of the ICC Statute, it makes sense for civil society to have a strong
interest in assuring the Court's normative legitimacy," particularly its institutional
integrity." In addition, the prospect of obtaining a meaningful return on the significant
37. . E.g., Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Redress Trust Observations Pursuant to Article 75
of the Statnte (May 15, 2015); Prosecutor v Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Observations of the Women's Initiatives
for Gender Justice on Reparations (May 10, 2012); Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/11, Redress Trust
Observations to Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court Pursuant to Rule 103 of the Rules
of Procedure and Evidence (Mar. 16,2012); Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08, Amicus Curiae
Observations on Superior Responsibility Submitted Pursuant to Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence (Apr. 20, 2009).
38. . Glasius, What Is Global Justice, supra note 20, at 511 (noting that the ICC's outreach is
insufficient and that civil society actors have helped to Gducatc local populations about the Court).
39. . Patricia Viseur Sellers, Gender Strategy is Not a Luxury for International Courts, 17 AM. U. J.
GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 301, 321 (2009).
40. . Fatou Bensouda, Prosecutor-elect of the Int'l Criminal Court, Gender Justice and the ICC:
Progress and Reflections, Statement Before the International Conference: 10 Years Review of the ICC.
Justice for All? The International Criminal Court 5 (Feb. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Statement of Fatou
Bensouda]. Further linking the two, the Executive Director of the Women's Initiative for Gender Justice
now serves, in a pro bono capacity, as the ICC Prosecutor's Special Gender Advisor. Press Release, Int'l
Criminal Court, ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda Appoints Brigid Inder, Executive Director of the
Women's Initiatives for Gender Justice, as Special Gender Advisor, ICC Press Release ICC-OTP-
20120821-PR833 (Aug. 21, 2012), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr833&n=en.
41. . See generally THE LAW AND PRAcTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Carsten
Stahn ed., 2015) (featuring nine chapters authored by individuals working for eight different NGOsj
contributions almost equal in number to those of ICC practitioners).
42. . Indeed, it was a South African NGO-Southern Africa Litigation Centre-that sought to ensure
the country's arrest of Omar al-Bashir, a move backed by more than 100 civil society organizations
worldwide Civil Societ .Declaration on Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir's Visit to South Africa Without
Arrest, HUM. RTs. WATCH (July 1, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/07/01/civil-society-declaration-
sudanese-president-omar-al-bashirs-visit-south-africa.
43. Augustfnyovd & Dumbryte, supra note 35, at 57.
44. Linda M. Keller, Comparing the "Interests of Justice": What the International Criminal Court Can
Learn from New York Law, 12 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 1, 10, 19 (2013) (designating civil society
actors as "self-perceived stakeholders").
45. As Bodansky explains, determining normative legitimacy requires one to ask "whether there are
good roasons why [an institution] should have the right to make the decisions it does." Daniel Bodansky,
Legitimacy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 704, 709 (Daniel
Bodansky et al. eds., 2007).
46. See, e.g., Allen Buchanan & Robert 0. Keohane, The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions,
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investments made in the Court is dependent upon the ICC's perceived or sociological
legitimacy. For, as Buchanan and Keohane note, "multilateral institutions will only
thrive if they are viewed as legitimate by democratic publics." 47
Yet whether the Court can attain (and ultimately sustain) this indispensable type
of legitimacy remains an open question. From the outset, court supporters noted that
this task would likely be more difficult because, as a "creation of global civil society,"
the ICC would "need[] to work much harder than national courts to gain legitimacy."
Since becoming operational, however, the Court seems perhaps even further away
from achieving this goal.49 Its failed attempts to bring heads of state to accounto have
created serious perception problems for the institution in an era when "every front
page case seems like a litmus test of what the ICC might accomplish."" The Court has
also been plagued by its record to date, which includes only three completed trials and
three convictions in more than a dozen years,52 prompting observers to question the
20 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 405, 422-24 (2006) (explaining the significance of institutional integrity and its
effects on institutional legitimacy).
47. Id. at 407.
48. Glasius, What is Global Justice, supra note 20, at 497.
49. By any account, the ICC got off to a rocky start. As Kaye observed in 2011: "[The ICC's first trial
was nearly dismissed twice. Its highest-profile suspects-Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and Joseph
Kony, the leader of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), the rebel group that has terrorized northern
Uganda and neighboring areas-have thumbed their noses at the court and are evading arrest. And with
all six of the ICC's investigations involving abuses in Africa, its reputation as a truly international tribunal
is in question." David Kaye, Who's Afraid of the International Criminal Court? Finding the Prosecutor Who
Can Set It Straight, 90 FOREIGN AFF. 118, 118-19 (2011).
50. An ICC arrest warrant against Sudan's president, Omar al-Bashir, remains unexecuted after seven
years, prompting ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II to request help from the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC). Press Release, Int'l Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber II Informs the United Nations Security
Council About Sudan's Non-Cooperation in the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Al Bashir, ICC Press
Release ICC-CPI-20150309-PR1094 (Mar. 9, 2015) (declaring that "if there is no follow up action on the
part of the UNSC, any referral by the Council to the ICC under Chapter VII of the UN Charter would never
achieve its ultimate goal, namely, to put an end to impunity"). Meanwhile, insufficient access to evidence
caused the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) to withdraw its charges against Kenya's current leader.
Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Withdrawal of Charges Against Mr Kenyatta,
paras. 4, 10 (Mar. 13, 2013).
51. Karen J. Alter, The Trials and Tribulations of Prosecuting Heads of States: Kenyatta and the ICC,
WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/201 4 /1 2 /1 9/the-
trials-and-tribulations-of-prosecuting-heads-of-states-kenyatta-and-the-iqc/ (noting that "powerful actors
have many tools to undermine prosecution").
52. See, e.g., Triestino Marinicllo, 'One, No One and One Hundred Thousand': Reflections on the
Multiple Identities of the ICC, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN SEARCH OF ITS PURPOSE AND
IDENTITY 1, 6 (Triestino Mariniello ed., 2015) (describing the difficulties that have plagued the ICC in
successfully prosecuting cases to completion). See also Jean-Pierre Bemba: DR Congo ex-warlord guilty of
war crimes, BBC NEWS (Mar. 21, 2016) (discussing the March 2016 verdict against Bemba, noting that he
was "only the third person to be convicted since the court's founding in 2002" and discussing why there have
been so few convictions at the Court).
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Court's competency," evoking criticism from established supporters,54 and providing
long-standing ICC opponents with new arguments against the institution."
Notably, the future shows no immediate signs of relief for the ICC in the court of
public opinion. Rather, despite the existing concern that the Court "faces an
unsustainable workload given its resources,"6 significant and sometimes unrealistic
expectations for the institution continue to flourish. Indeed, despite an already
crowded docket and a history of inadequate support from the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) for the matters referred by it to the Court,7 there are current calls
for the UNSC to add the Islamic State" and the situation in North Korea 9 to the ICC's
existing caseload. In addition, there is a growing demand for the OTP to bring charges
53. "[T]he ICC, in its current form, is by no means a well-run judicial institution." Karnavas, supra note
16, at 20; see also Editorial, The International Criminal Court on Shaky Ground, WASH. POST (Dec. 28,
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-international-criminal-court-on-shaky-ground/2014/
12/28/8d11a3d6-815c-11e4-81fd-8c4814dfa9d7_story.html (describing the Court as "foundering," discussing
"the ICC's chances of gaining international credibility," and concluding that its record "suggests the court
lacks the clout" to pursue important cases); Somini Sengupta, Is the War Crimes Court Still Relevant?, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/11/sunday-review/is-the-war-crimes-court-still-
relevant.html? (observing that the Court has recently been "dismissed as ineffective, or even irrelevant" and
"has convicted a tiny fraction of those it has charged").
54. See, e.g., Aryeh Neier, The ICC Still Has a Chance, JAMES G. STEWART (Feb. 25, 2015),
http://jamesgstewart.com/the-icc-still-has-a-chance/ (acknowledging that "it is necessary to raise questions
about the ICC's failure to achieve more").
55. "When the International Criminal Court was being formed, I was among those who criticized it ....
[I anticipated] a U.S.-style independent prosecutor ranging around the world looking for trouble.... [Ilt
turns out by now that the bigger problem is that the Court is accomplishing too little." David Davenport,
Opinion, International Criminal Court: 12 Years, $1 Billion, 2 Convictions, FORBES (Mar. 12,2014,2:57 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/daviddavenport/2014/03/12/international-criminal-court-12-years-1-billion-2-
convictions-2/#6bfdl22c6440 (arguing that the money funding the Court would be better spent
strengthening national and regional systems).
56. Patrick Smith, Justice: Slow Progress for African Cases at the ICC, AFR. REP. (July 5, 2013, 3:53
PM), http://www.theafricareport.com/North-Africa/justice-slow-progress-for-african-cases-at-the-icc.html
(attributing this perspective to Phil Clark and noting that "[n]one of the court's main financiers seems eager
to increase contributions to its budget").
57. The UNSC's failure to provide adequate support following the Darfur referral recently prompted
the ICC Prosecutor to hibernate the investigation, informing the UNSC that "[w]hat is needed is a dramatic
shift in this Council's approach to arresting Darfur suspects." Press Release, Security Council, Amid
Growing Brutality in Darfur, International Criminal Court Prosecutor Urges Security Council to Rethink
Tactics for Arresting War Crime Suspects, U.N. Press Release SC/11696 (Dec. 12, 2014); see also Mark
Kersten, The ICC May Not Bring Justice to Syria, WASH. POST (May 12, 2014),
https://wvw.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey cage/wp/2014/05/12/thc-icc-may-not-bring-justice-to-syria/
(noting that the UNSC referrals of the situations in Darfur and Libya left the Court bearing the entire
financial burden of the subsequent investigations and without the support necessary to bring the persons
charged to The Hague).
58. Editorial, The Crimes of Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/
03/opinion/the-crimes-of-terrorists.html (endorsing an appeal made to the UNSC to refer the Islamic State
to the ICC).
59. Somini Sengupta, United Nations Security Council Examines North Korea's Human Rights, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/23/worldlasialunited-nations-security-council-
examines-north-koreas-human-rights.html (noting that the UN Commission of Inquiry on North Korea
recommended that the Security Council refer North Korea to the ICC).
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in the politically charged situation in Palestinew despite the evidentiary and
institutional challenges such a move is likely to impose.61
Rather plainly, then, these observations ought to help shape the next phase of the
relationship between civil society and the ICC. Because the Court's challenges appear
likely to worsen before they improve, the institution would clearly benefit from efforts
designed to help it effectively meet its responsibilities while managing public
expectations. Accordingly, those members of civil society vested in the Court's long-
term success should take any available steps that might ease the ever-increasing
burdens placed on the ICC, particularly on the OTP. 62 At the same time, they ought
to adopt practices designed to enhance the way the institution is viewed in the court of
public opinion, helping to advance the ICC's beleaguered status in the so-called
"perception game."0 As the following Parts demonstrate, however, the opportunistic
use of the Article 15 communications process runs the risk of undermining both of
these important aims.
IV. THE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH ARTICLE 15 COMMUNICATIONS
A. The Administrative Burden
As the ICC became operational, the administrative burden created by the Article
15 communications process was a noted concern.6 In fact, one organizer worried that
the OTP would "be bombarded with communications alleging violations of the Rome
Statute," perhaps as many as 1000 a week. While this dire prediction has not come
to pass, the resources required to process the more than 11,500 submissions received
60. See Khaled Abu Toameh & Tovah Lazaroff, Palestinians Attempting to Fast Track War Crimes Suits
Against Israel at ICC, JERUSALEM POST (Apr. 6, 2015, 10:52 PM), http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-
Conflict/Palestinians-attempting-to-fast-track-war-crimes-suits-against-Israel-at-ICC-396362 (explaining
that the Palestinian leadership is seeking to file charges against Israel in the ICC).
61. See, e.g., Kevin Jon Holler, The ICC in Palestine: Be Careful What You Wish For, JUST. IN CONrLICT
(Apr. 2, 2015), http://justiceinconflict.org/2015/04/02/the-icc-in-palestine-be-careful-what-you-wish-for/
[hereinafter Heller, The ICC in Palestine] (noting that an ICC investigation would alienate superpowers and
that Israel would likely hinder access to evidence gathering unless its actors were excluded from the
investigation).
62. See id. ("To say that the OTP is overstretched is a considerable understatement."); Mark Kersten,
What Will Define Bensouda's Tenure? We're Still Waiting, JUST. HUB (June 17, 2015, 11:02 AM),
http://justicehub.org/article/courtside-justice-what-will-define-bensoudas-tenure-were-still-waiting (noting
the OTP's limited budget and that it is "at, or very close, to its maximum case and trial capacity").
63. Mark Keroten, Africa and the ICC: Some Unsolicited Advice, JUST. IN CONrLIcr (May 28, 2013),
http://justiceinconflict.org/2013/05/28/africa-and-the-icc-some-unsolicited-advice/ [hereinafter Kersten,
Africa and the ICC]. In response to Kersten's assessment of the Court's deficiencies in the "perception
game," CICC convenor William Pace pledged to restart the organization's "modia 'education' efforts" that
surrounded the drafting and adoption of the Court's Statute). William Pace, Comment to id. (May 29,2013,
6:53 PM), https://justiceinconflict.org/2013/05/28/africa-and-the-icc-some-unsolicited-advice/#comment-
11598.
64. See Sam Muller, Establishing an Effective International Criminal Court, in INTERNATIONALWA
CRIMES TRIALS: MAKING A DIFFERENCE? 132, 144 (Steven R. Ratner & James L. Bischoff eds., 2004)
(expressing concerns on the number of communications likely to be received).
65. Id. (basing the estimate on the number of letters received weekly by the European Court of Human
Rights).
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to date are nevertheless significant. This is because the OTP fulfills its statutory
obligation as recipient of the communications by way of a comprehensive vetting
process. Once the OTP's Information and Evidence Unit (IEU) receives and registers
a communication, the IEU conducts a review.w The IEU's analyses are then reported
to the Jutisdiction, Cornplementarity, and Cooperation Division (JCCD) on a weekly
basis.17 For its part, the JCCD must review the IEU's reports and generate its own
reports for the Prosecutor and the Executive Committee with recommendations.6 The
Prosecutor then makes a determination after a question and comment period 69 and, if
the Prosecutor concludes there is no reasonable basis for conducting an investigation,
the IEU must then notify the information provider. Owing to this extensive
examination process, communications made for purposes other than prompting ICC-
related action create a significant amount of "busy work" for multiple OTP entities,
when few of the staff are likely in need of something to do to pass time." Perhaps even
more damaging to the Court, however, are the misperceptions that can be generated
by highly publicized communications.
B. The Perception Costs of Article 15 "Complaints"
An unfortunate reality is that Article 15 communications are frequently referred
to as "complaints," both by information providers and the media. Misleadingly, the
term complaint suggests, consistent with its usage in the Rome Statute, that some type
of legal action has been initiated at the ICC.7 2 This inference is also consistent with
the use of the term on the domestic level. In continental systems, for example,
prosecutors are generally obliged to act upon a victim's "complaint"73 and a victim may
66. International Criminal Court, Annex to the "Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the
Prosecutor": Referrals and Communications, regs. 3.1, 4.1 (Sept. 2003), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/
278614ED-A8CA-4835-B91D-DB7FA7639EO2/143706/policy-annexfinal_210404.pdf.
67. Id. reg. 4.1.
68. Id. reg. 4.3, 4.5.
69. Id. reg. 4.5.
70. Id. reg. 4.5(a); Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 15(6).
71. As of November 2014, the work of the OTP included nine preliminary examinations, four active
investigations, five trials, and one appeal. Int'l Criminal Court [ICC], Report of the Committee on Budget
and Finance on the Work of Its Twenty-Third Session, para. 36, ICC-ASP/13/15 (Nov. 18, 2014),
https://www.icc-cpi.intdiccdocsa/ap_docs/ASP13/ICC ASP 13 15 ENG.pdf, Since that time, a surprise arrest
re activated a nearly decade old case, a preliminary examination was opened in response to the declaration
lodged by the government of Palestine, and the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber authorized the Prosecutor to launch
a proprio motu investigation into the situation in Georgia. See, respectively, Press Release, Int'l Criminal
Court, Dominic Ongwen Transferred to The Hague, ICC-CPI-20150120-PR1084 (Jan. 20, 2015),
http.//www.ic-pi.intcneilcnus/icc/press%20and%20medialpress %20releases/Pages/pr1084.aspx; Press
Release, Int'l Criminal Court [ICC], The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda,
Opens a Preliminary Examination of the Situation in Palestine, ICC-OTP-20150116-PR1083 (Jan. 16,2015),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/cn-menus/icc/press%20and%20media/pros%20rolease/Pages/pr1083.aspx;
Decision on the Prosecutor's request for authorization ofan investigation, Case No. ICC-01/15 (Jan. 27, 2016).
72. See Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 17(1)(c) (declaring that an ICC case will be deemed
inadmissible when "[t]he person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the subject of the
complaint").
73. See, e.g., CODE DE PROCtDURE PtNALE [C. PR. PEN.] [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 86 (Fr.)
(requiring prosecutors to investigate complaints except when the alleged facts do not support the finding of
a criminal offense).
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even enjoy the right to appeal when such a complaint is not pursued.7 4 Similarly,
persons hailing from common law systems, wherein the term complaint is distinctly
tied to the initiation of litigation," may well conclude that the filing of a "complaint"
harkens the beginning of an ICC case. Indeed, although frequently connected to the
commencement of civil actions,7 6 the term "complaint" is also associated with criminal
prosecutions at common law. Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in the
United States, for example, the criminal process begins when a complaint is sworn
before a magistrate judge.n As a result, hearing that a "complaint" has been filed at
the Court is likely to create broadly the impression that some type of legal action at
the ICC is officially underway.
Widely publicized communications pose a considerable risk of augmenting this
misunderstanding. In fact, even when information providers take scrupulous care to
employ the Court's communication terminology in their press releases, media
coverage tends to shy away from this unfamiliar legal term, reverting instead to the
term "complaint.",7  This terminology makes it a short leap for those hearing it-
including those reporting on Court events-to conclude that there is, in fact, a case
before the Court. This, in turn, runs the risk of making it appear that external actors -
in particular members of civil society-have the ability to set the Court's agenda,
inadvertently making credible the once popular claims of U.S. Court-opponents that
"the ICC [would] be 'captured' not by governments but by NGOs,""9 and that
"NGOs ... [would] have too much access and influence over the Court's investigative
processes.""O Moreover, even if the impression created is simply that a "complaint"
results in an official investigation, this suggests that Court opponents were right to
warn that the ICC could open unwarranted investigations with "enormous political
impact."81
74. See, e.g., STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], §171, translation at
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch-stpo/englischstpo.html#pl434 (Ger.) (stating that one who
files a complaint may contest a prosecutor's failure to investigate it).
75. In Australia, for example, "[a] civil proceeding must be commenced by the filing of a complaint."
MAGIS. CT. GEN. CIv. P. R. 4.04 (S.R. No. 1440/2010) (Austl.).
76. See, e.g., id. (stating that in Australia, a complaint is necessary to initiate a civil action).
77. FED. R. CRIM. P. 3.
78. See, e.g., Press Release, European Ctr. for Constitutional & Human Rights, The International
Criminal Court Must Investigate UK Military Abuses Against Iraqi Detainees from 2003 to 2008 as War
Crimes (Jan. 10, 2014), http://www.ecchr.eultl-files/Dokumente/Universelle%20JustizlUK-ICC,%
20Press%20Release,%202014-01-10.pdf (exclusively using the term "communication"); UK Politicians
Accused of Iraq War Crimes, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 10, 2014), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2014/01/
uk-politicians-accused-iraq-war-crimes-20141110230724774.html (drawing from the press release, yet
replacing the word "communication" with "complaint"); British Politicians and Generals Targeted in Iraq
Abuse Case, GUARDIAN (Jan. 11, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/law/2014/jan/12/iraq-war-crimes
(exclusively using the term "complaint"); Per Lijas, Top U.K. Defense Officials Accused of War Crimes,
TIME (Jan. 13, 2014), http://world.time.com/2014/01/13/top-u-k-defense-officials-accused-of-war-crimes/
(exclusively using the term "complaint").
79. Is a U.N. International Criminal Court in the U.S. National Interest?: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Int'l Operations of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 105th Cong. 64 (1998) (prepared statement of
John R. Bolton) [hereinafter Bolton Statement].
80. W. Chadwick Austin & Antony Barone Kolenc, Who's Afraid of the Big Bad Wolf? The
International Criminal Court as a Weapon of Asymmetric Warfare, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 291, 319
(2006) (citing the prospect that this influence would be wielded by "NGOs with an anti-U.S. agenda" as
"[t]he major U.S. concern").
81. John R. Bolton, The Risks and Weaknesses of the International Criminal Court from America's
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In reality, however, external actors have no authority to bring about a Court
investigation or prosecution, and an extensive vetting process takes place after
communications are filed. Once a matter proposed for investigation makes it past the
numerous screening procedures noted above,n OTP must then obtain judicial
approval before it can commence an official investigation." Following this-before
specific charges can be brought-OTP must convince the Pre-Trial Chamber that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed crimes that fall
within the jurisdiction of the Court." Even if this hurdle can be overcome, a case
cannot be brought to trial unless the Prosecutor satisfies the Court at a confirmation
of charges hearing that there are substantial grounds to believe the person committed
the crimes charged.8 ' As the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber has repeatedly explained, this
latter procedure constitutes a "mechanism ... designed to protect the rights of the
Defence against wrongful and wholly unfounded charges," " by "distinguishing those
cases that should go to trial from those that should not.""
Critically, these procedures align with those of a reputable court and are
employed at no small cost to the ICC.8 Indeed, because due process tends to mean
protracted process," the protections involved contribute significantly to the glacial
operational pace for which the Court is frequently criticized." In fact, the multiple
safeguards employed before a case can be initiated (or a prosecution commenced) rival
or exceed those generally available at the domestic level, a distinction that seems
fitting for a Court responsible for prosecuting the gravest crimes known to
humankind.9' Unfortunately, however, the suggestion that a communication
automatically results in an ICC case creates the opposite perception. In fact, the belief
that anyone can invoke the Court's jurisdiction simply by filing a "complaint"
Perspective, 41 VA. J. INT'LL. 186, 194 (2000) (drawing on the U.S. experience with independent prosecutors
to demonstrate how the ICC Prosecutor could create "dramatic news ... without ever bringing formal
charges").
82. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
83. Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 15(3).
84. Id. art. 58(1).
85. Id. art. 61(5)-(6).
86. Prosecutor v. Dyilo, ICC-01-/04-01/06-803, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, para. 37 (Jan.
29, 2007).
87. Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, ICC-01/04-01/10-465, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, para.
41 (Dec. 16, 2011).
88. See GIDEON BOAS ET AL., 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 185-86 (2011) (noting
difficult hurdles the court goes through to ensure legal sufficiency).
89. "The course of justice, conducted in scrupulous compliance with fair trial procedures, is often by
nature a slow process.. . ." Press Release, General Assembly, Assembly Appraises Progress Made by War
Crimes Tribunals; Judges Describe Obstacles, U.N. Press Release GA/9652 (Nov. 8, 1999) (quoting then-
President of the ICTR, Navanethem Pillay).
90. In practice, it seems that the confirmation of charges provision has added more time to the process
than initially anticipated. SCHABAS, supra note 7, at 735 (noting the lengthy decisions delivered). It should
be noted, however, that a thorough pre-trial review may inure to the benefit of the prosecution and
detriment of the accused. In the Gbagbo case, for example, the Pre-Trial Chamber adjourned the hearing
after it "roqucsted the Prosecutor to consider providing further evidence or conducting further investigation
with respect to all charges." Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, ICC-02-/11-01/11-656, Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges Against Laurent Gbagbo, para. 9 (June 12, 2014). One year later, after adducing further evidence,
a set of amended charges against Gbagbo were confirmed. Id. para. 278.
91. For a similar view, see BOAS ET AL., supra note 88, at 185-86 (contending that a confirmation of
charges hearing "provides greater protection for the rights of the suspect, enhances the credibility of the
court or tribunal, and could reduce inefficiency in later stages of the proceedings").
THE HIDDEN COSTS OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS
resurrects and bolsters widespread, once-popular claims that the ICC could be used to
pursue "unfounded charges" and "politicized prosecutions.""'
Communications and associated commentaries that name specific individuals and
claim (or suggest) that ICC charges have been brought against them are apt to
exacerbate this problem and create the disagreeable perception that the Court's
procedures can be manipulated for political advantage. This, in turn, is liable to
resurrect concerns that were so significant that they shaped the drafting process of the
ICC statute. Notably, early drafts of the statute authorized State Parties-which,
unlike communications filers, have the authority to trigger the Court's jurisdiction"-
to do so by lodging a "complaint" with the Court.u At Rome, however, the title
"Complaint" turned into "Referral of a situation by a State Party"9' because the
iclevant provision was amended to require that States refer "situations," rather than
specific cases." As Kirsch and Robinson explain, this change was designed to "reduce
the arguably unseemly prospect of States Parties referring complaints against specific
individuals" and to diminish the attendant perception that the Court could be used to
"settle scores."" Accordingly, by filing "complaints" that target specific individuals,
92. E.g., Statement by the President, Office of the Press Sec'y, Signature of the International Criminal
Court Treaty (Dec. 31, 2000), http://clinton4.nara.gov/textonlylibrary/hot-releases/December_31
2000.html.
93. Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 13(a). The Court's jurisdiction can also be triggered by a Security
Council referral or upon the Prosecutor's own motion. Id. art. 13(b)-(c). It is the latter possibility at which
Article 15 communications are targeted. Notably, OTP conducts its preliminary examination activities in
exactly the same manner, "irrespective of whether the Office receives a referral from a State Party or the
Security Council or acts on the basis of information received pursuant to article 15." THE OFFICE OF THE
PROSECUTOR, INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, REPORT ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION ACTIVITIES 2012, supra
note 4, paras. 3, 10 (2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/C433C462-7C4E-4358-8A72-
8D99FDOOE8CD/285209/OTP2012ReportonPreliminaryExaminations22Nov20l2.pdf (noting that, in
accordance with Article 53, the Prosecutor must always considcr jurisdiction, adaiissibility, and intrus Uf
justice concerns before commencing a formal investigation). The triggering distinction becomes relevant
after this analysis, as only proprio motu investigations require judicial authorization. Rome Statute, supra
note 5, art. (15)(3). In addition, only referring States and the Security Council have the right to seek judicial
review if the Prosecutor determines that there is no reasonable basis to conduct an investigation. Id. art.
53(3).
94. William A. Schabas, Complementarity in Practice: Creative Solutions or a Trap for the Court?, in
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS 25,31 (Mauro Politi & Federica
Giola eds., 2008) [hereinafter Schabas, Complementarity in Practice].
95. Id.; Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 14.
96. Schabas, Complementarity in Practice, supra note 94, at 31 32 (noting that the altered title was likely
prompted by the fact that States were "prevented from submitting a specific Case or crime to the Court").
Security Council referrals appear to be likewise constrained, although apparently not because the Rome
Statute's provision regarding them confers jurisdiction when "a situation" is referred to the Prosecutor.
Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 13(b). Instead, the limitation is attributable to the fact that the faithful
exercise of the Council's Chapter VII peace and security powers requires it to deal with situations rather
than the fate of particular individuals. See Luigi Condorelli & Santiago Villalpando, Referral and Deferral
by the Security Council, in 1 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY 627, 632 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002) (noting that, despite the requirement of handling
situations rather than individual cases, there may be rare instances in which "the impunity of specific
individuals would constitute per se a threat to the peace," which would enable the Council to refer their
cases to the Court).
97. Philippe Kirsch & Darryl Robinson, Referrals by States Parties, in THF ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY, supra note 96, at 619, 623. Despite this, it is, of
course, still possible for states to use the referral process "as a pretext for pursuing political agenda."
Karnavas, supra note 16, at 23 (discussing the Comoros' Mavi Marvara referral).
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information providers create the precise harm in the court of public opinion that the
ICC drafters sought to avoid.
This, in turn, exposes a real tension between what makes for an effective strategic
communication and what is good for the Court. Because communications and
publicity "go together hand in hand as part of an overall strategy,"" information
providers may lean towards crafting communications and related materials in ways
that make them more likely to garner media attention. To that end, suggesting that a
high ranking government official "has been accused of war crimes before the
International Criminal Court in The Hague"" or that an information provider is
"[t]aking [a] ... Prime Minister to the International Criminal Court"'o is more likely
to make headlines than a press release that simply states that the ICC Prosecutor has
been asked to look into a matter.
Further concerns arise when one contemplates the additional effects likely
created by this type of publicity. Victims and others interested in the alleged crimes
will be apt to blame the Court when, as will almost invariably be so, an investigation is
not launched."'o Media followers may likewise attribute the Court's failure to proceed
on a highly publicized matter to realpolitik or other unsavory reasons" while others
may erroneously perceive the Court's failure to act as further evidence of its inability
to produce results, reinforcing what is perhaps one of the most popular and damaging
attacks on the Court to date."o3
C. Remedial Measures and the Office of the Prosecutor
These observations perhaps logically prompt the question of whether and how
the ICC can act to protect its interests in the so-called "perception game."'10  One
answer might be for the Court to consider "adopting modalities to combat or at least
limit" communications that constitute "abusive attempts to drag the ICC into the
sordid quagmire of domestic politics""o or otherwise evidence an instrumental use of
the Court's processes. For such an approach to be successful in the wake of
98. Lobel, Courts as Forums, supra note 10, at 560 (discussing strategic litigation).
99. Complaint Against John Howard to the International Criminal Court, AUSTL. INDEP. MEDIA
NETWORK (Jan. 11, 2015), http://theaimn.com/complaint-john-howard-intemational-criminal-court/.
100. Cadman, supra note 9.
101. It is frequently maintained that the Court has never opened a formal investigation as a result of an
Article 15 communication. See, e.g., Rachel Zoll, Int'l Court Case Against Ex-Pope Fizzles, MERCURY
NEWS (June 13, 2013), http://www.mercurynews.com/ci_23451674/intl-court-case-against-ex-pope-fizzles.
While this is technically true, the reality is somewhat more nuanced. See, e.g., Fabricio Guariglia & Emeric
Rogier, The Selection of Situations and Cases by the OTP of the ICC, in THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 41, at 350, 357 (acknowledging that a lone communication
will ordinarily be insufficient to prompt action, but maintaining that "all relevant communications
contribute to the Office's overall information" and noting that Article 15 communications were received
with respect to the situations in Kenya and Cote D'Ivoire).
102. For specific examples of this in response to the Vatican-targeted communication, see infra Parts VI,
VII.
103. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
104. See Kersten, Africa and the ICC, supra note 63 (arguing that this is currently a losing effort for the
Court and that the ICC should adopt "a professional communication strategy which does not shy away from
political controversies or rely exclusively on legal arguments").
105. Karnavas, supra note 16, at 31 (criticizing a Cambodian political party that hired a law firm to
engage in an Article 15-related public relations campaign).
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information provider-generated publicity, however, it would first require an exception
to the OTP policy of maintaining the confidentiality of its communications analyses.
This would free the OTP to render public and reasoned decisions, which might help to
counter the erroneous inferences otherwise apt to be drawn when a communication is
rejected.1 7 In support of this approach, one might reasonably argue that the highly
publicized nature of a communication warrants deviation from a policy that is designed
to protect the confidentiality of information and the "safety, well-being and privacy"
of information providers.'' By its very nature, a highly publicized communication
means there is no confidentiality to protect and that its authors don't fear reprisal for
providing the information.
Consistent with this analysis, OTP has selectively made exceptions to its
confidentiality policy in the wake of media reports and public inquiries. Yet
adopting more extensive exceptions to respond to strategic communications would
likely mean public criticism of civil society, potentially alienating some of the key
entities upon whom OTP relies for help in its investigations and prosecutions."'
Moreover, OTP may be disinclined to deviate too far from its. current practice, as
relatively private analyses provide a certain amount of cover when communications
are not acted upon. Keeping communications generally under wraps curtails public
questions and criticism, which is particularly helpful when requests are rejected or
permitted to linger indefinitely owing to some non-legal objective."' OTP might also
see other advantages to maintaining the status quo, as greater transparency regarding
106. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
107. For specific examples of erroneous inferences made in response to the Vatican-targeted
communication, see infra Parts VI, VII.
108. INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, at r. 49 (2013). In addition to
Rule 49, Rule 46 has been cited by OTP in support of its confidontial treatment of communications. See id.
nt r. 46 ("[T]he Prosecutor shall protect the confidentiality of such information and testimony or take any
other necessary measures, pursuant to his or her duties under the Statute.").
109. See, e.g., Elena Arekaljan, APC's Petition: International Criminal Court to Probe Patience Jonathan,
NTERIANNATION (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.nigeriannation.com/news/apes petition international
criminal-court-to-probe-patience-jonathan.aspx (describing an instance in which the OTP responded to a
press inquiry by stating that "the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court can confirm
receipt of the communication referred to since the sender of the communication has made this fact public in
the media") (emphasis added); see also Press Release, Int'l Criminal Court, The Determination of the Office
of the Prosecutor on the Communication Received in Relation to Egypt, ICC-OTP-20140508-PR1003 (May
8, 2015) (providing "clarifying information on its determination regarding a communication received in
relation to the situation in Egypt" after "recent media reports and enquiries from the public").
110. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text; see also Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-
01/08-2721, Decision on the Admission into Evidence of Items Deferred in the Chamber's "Decision on the
Prosecutor's Application for Admission of Materials into Evidence Pursuant to Article 64(9) of the Rome
Statute," para. 26 (June 27, 2013) (permitting the Prosecution to submit numerous reports by NGOs in
support of its case-in-chief). One of the reports was writton by the F6dration Internationale des Droits de
I'Homme (FIDH), id. paras. 5(c), 16, 18-21. The FIDH has filed and backed numerous, well-publicized
Article 15 communications. See, e.g., Press Release, FIDH, Cambodia: ICC Preliminary Examination
Requested into Crimes Stemming from Mass Land Grabbing (Oct. 7, 2014),
https://www.fidh.org/International-Federation-for-Human-Rights/asia/cambodia/16176-cambodia-icc-
preliminary-examination-requested-into-crimes-stemming-from (detailing an Article 15 communication
presenting the Cambodian government's land acquisition efforts as crimes against humanity).
111. See, e.g., id. (citing a fully viable communication known to the author that had not been acted upon
for political reasons).
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its selection policies could lead to a call for judicial intervention "on behalf of the
victims who do not see their interests sufficiently taken into account by the OTP." 112
Even setting these self-protective concerns aside, however, OTP arguably ought
not to be saddled with the task of fashioning a remedy for the problems created by
strategic communications. If anything, this merely augments the administrative
burden that the communications process imposes on an already overtaxed organ of the
Court.1 13 Moreover, even assuming OTP were able to fine-tune its responses to address
only those communications most likely to create dangerous misperceptions about the
Court, this limited public commentary might have a chilling effect on communications,
undermining rather than fostering victim access to the Court. Finally, it is doubtful
that a legal response from OTP could constitute an effective counter to existing,
widespread, and misleading publicity. As an initial matter, important ground will be
lost in the time it takes to respond. More importantly, public rejections rife with
legalese are unlikely to attract adequate media attention in a way that would
effectively address the misperceptions already created. 114 Moreover, even in the
unlikely event that an accessibly crafted rejection were to receive extensive media
attention, these ideal conditions are unlikely to make the Court whole. As law has
recognized elsewhere," many of those who read the misleading publicity in the first
instance will never see its subsequent correction.
In other words, irrespective of any Court-created response, the best way to
protect the ICC in the court of public opinion is for information providers who have a
vested interest in the Court's long-term success to exercise greater care in how they
use and publicize the Article 15 communication process. On the most fundamental
level, this means that the process should not be used as an "attention-getting strategy
for advancing [a] non-ICC related agenda,"" no matter how laudable the alternative
objectives, as these types of communications not only create unnecessary work for the
Court, but present a distinct risk of inadvertently contributing to the ICC's perception
problems. A closer analysis of the September 2011 Vatican-targeted communication
helps to illustrate why this is so.
V. THE VATICAN-TARGETED COMMUNICATION: STRATEGIC OR
GENUINE?
Before considering the ways in which the Vatican-targeted ICC effort lends
unwitting credence to some of the most popular criticisms of the Court, it makes sense
to first address whether the request for an ICC investigation was strategic in nature,
112. Kai Ambos, Prosecuting International Crimes at the National and International Level: Between
Justice and Realpolitik, in INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS CRIMEs 55, 58 (Wolfgang
Kaleck et al. eds., 2007).
113. See supra notes 62, 64-66 and accompanying text.
114. It strains credulity to suppose that the legal reasons behind a decision not to investigate might attract
press coverage comparable to that associated with a sensationalistic claim. For example, while a Lexis search
reveals more than 100 articles in English that reported on the Vatican-targeted communication in the month
after it was filed; a like search during the month after its rejection reveals fewer than twenty articles on the
topic. See generally LEXIs ADVANCE, https://advance.lexis.com.
115. In libel law, a retraction in the same publication vehicle is ordinarily not a defense in a defamation
action because "[tihousands may have read the libelous matter that never saw its refutation." Cass v. New
Orleans Times, 27 La. Ann. 214, 219 (1875).
116. Karnavas, supra note 16, at 15.
298 [VOL. 51:3
THE HIDDEN COSTS OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS
or whether it was made with the genuine aim of securing Court action. After all, many
of the statements made by the relevant information provider-the Center for
Constitutional Rights (CCR) acting on behalf of the Survivor's Network of Those
Abused by Priests (SNAP) -suggest the request was genuine and, if these assertions
are true, the communication falls outside this Article's area of concern.
First, in one way or another, each of the three related filings the CCR submitted
to the OTP on the matter "urge [the] office to initiate an investigation and prosecution
of high-level Vatican officials."". In addition, those associated with the effort
appealed to Vatican insiders to share evidence with the ICC Prosecutor,"" requested
victims come forward with evidence to support the conununication,"' and publicly
called on the Court "to take [the] case seriously and do the right thing."'12 What is
more, in response to the significant commentary generated by its September 2011
media campaign, the CCR specifically admonished those who supported its effoi I, but
expressed doubt about its aim, maintaining that it "brought this case to the ICC
because it belongs there-not only to shine a much needed and long overdue spotlight
on the issue.""' Nevertheless, other insider staltements suggest that the endeavoi was
not really designed to bring about an ICC investigation or prosecution. Instead, the
Vatican-targeted effort was desciibed as part of an ongoing (and frustrating) al lelupi
to incentivize the Church to alter its policies regarding priests accused of abuse.'22 In
fact, as one leading SNAP figure explained the ICC effort, the group had to "try all
117. Communication Ltter, supra note 18. Sce International Criminal Court, Victims' Communication
Pursuant to Ai ticl. 15 of the Rom,. Statute Requesting Investigation and Prosecution of Iigh-Level Vdtiean
Officials for Rape and Other Forms of Sexual Violence as Crimes Against Humanity and Torture as a Crime
Against Humanity, at para. 82, ICC File No. OTP-CR-159/11 (Sept. 13, 2011), http://s3.documentcloud.org/
dociiments/243877/victims-communication.pdf [hereinafter CCR September Filing] (describing a report
noting "the prevalence of cases concerning institutions affiliated with the Catholic Church"); Letter from
Pamela C Spees, Senior Staff Attorney, Ctr for Constitutional Rights, to Luis Moreno Ocampo, Prosecutor,
Int'l Criminal Court (Apr. 11, 2012), https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/fileslattachl2014/12/CCR
SNAP_- SupplementallCCSubmission%282012-04-11%29.pdf [hereinafter Letter Supplementing ICC
Communication] (stating that the September 2011 filing "urged an investigation into the responsibility of
four high-level Vatican officials" and that "the situation rcquirc[d] a prosecutor with international
jurisdiction to undei take a serious aid thoroughgoing investigation of the systcmic nature of these crimes").
118. "I wanted to make an appeal to anyone in the Vatican ... a special plea for those who work in
churches or used to work in them, to come forward with the evidence...." Sex Abuse Victims Call for
Vatican Insiders to Speak Out, INTERAKSYON (Sept. 21, 2011), http://www.interaksyon.com/article/13493/
sex-abuse-victims-call-for-vatican-insiders-to-speak-out (quoting Vincent Warren of the Center for
Constitutional Rights (CCR) as also saying people with information "have to hand it to the ICC").
119. Callfor Bishops to Release Files, IRISH TIMES (Sept. 13,2011), http://www.irishtimes.com/news/call-
for-bishops-to-release-files-1.883433.
120. Id.
121. Pain Spees, In the Case Against Vatican Officials for Rape and Sexual Violence, We've Corne to the
End of the Beginning, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS. (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.ccrjustice.org/home/get-
involved/tools-resources/inside-ccr/case-against-vatican-officials-rape-and-sexual-violence [hereinafter
Specs, We've Come to the End].
122. "We've been doing this a long time, and it's just hard to figure out what we can do because we've
tried so many things, and of everything we've tried nothing has succeeded to make church officials change
their policies....." Group Seeks Investigation of Pope, Others, BLADE (Sept. 14, 2011),
http://www.toledoblade.com/Religion/2011/09/14/Group-seeks-investigation-of-Pope-others.html (quoting
Survivor's Network of Those Abused by Priests (SNAP) President Barbara Blaine).
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the channels" it could because the Chuich will change its approach "only when there
is external pressure."1
Understandably, this external pressure did not materialize when the CCR first
effectively (yet quietly) initiated the Article 15 process by email in May 2011.124 Only
the intense publicity campaign crafted to accompany its second such filing the
following September had this intended effect."' This later submission, described by
the CCR as a "complaint," was accompanied by a widely distributed press release
proclaiming that "Vatican officials" had been charged with "crimes against
humanity." 126 Within two weeks, more than 100 news articles appeared on the topic
worldwide, thanks to an ambitious publicity operation, which included an in-person
visit to The Hague where a CCR attorney "walk[ed] to the Court with victims to hand
prosecutors boxes full of documents."' Victims were also invited to "[j]oin CCR and
SNAP on it's [sic] European Tour," 128 which included twelve city visits and ended in
Rome in order to "bring the case to the Vatican's door."'
While this significant publicity campaign may seem designed to put pressure on
the ICC Prosecutor to act, there is much to indicate otherwise. Indeed, even the
attorney who authored the CCR filings publicly acknowledged that she was "not
hopeful" about the prospects for an investigation." 0 What is more, this assessment was
consistent with the views espoused by multiple academics and international ctininal
law practitioners who weighed in on the issue, both in the press and the legal
123. Id. (quoting SNAP President Barbara Blaine).
124. OTP provided the self-proclaimed Article 15 communication with the reference number "OTP-CR-
15911," the Aefe iere inc'hded in OTP's ultiliAte Lejection of the matter, which refers to the conununication
it received in May 2011. Rejection Letter, supra note 19. Despite this and despite the fact that the
communication itself is appropriately titled, the CCR website refers to the filing as a "preliminary
communication." SNAP v. the Pope, et al, CTr. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIG ITS, http://ccrjustice.org/home/
what-we-do/our-cases/snap-v-pope-et-al (last visited May 16, 2016).
125. "International human rights bodies have paid increasing attention to the crisis of sexual violence in
the Catholic Church following CCR's filing, in September 2011, of a case with the International Criminal
Court on behalf of SNAP against the former Pope and other high-level Vatican officials for crimes against
humanity." Press Release, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, Vatican Officials Questioned by Second UN
Committee About Sexual Violence (May 5, 2014), http://ccrjustice.org/home/press-center/press-
lea/vaticn-officials-qucstionied-scod un-cnuni~ttcc-about-seuaLl. Tht, LtrALIC ineaturC of the
campaign, described herein, is consistent with the conclusion that the Court's Article 15 mechanism was
used strategically. See, e.g., Lobel, Courts as Forums, supra note 10, at 560 (explaining how litigation and
publicity "go together hand in hand as part of an overall strategy").
126. First September 2011 Press Release, supra note 1.
127. Abuse Victims Seek Court Case Against Pope, USA TODAY (Sept. 9, 2011),
Ip l!I'ateday30.usilday.comruews!religi0 tta y!2011-09-13/intentational-court-pope-
abuse/50389966/1.
128. Join CCR and SNAP on It's European Tour- EUROPE, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS. (last updated Sept.
15, 2011), http://www.ccrjustice.org/home/get-involved/events/join-ccr-and-snap-its-european-tour-europe.
129. First September 2011 Press Release, supra note 1; see also MICHAEL D'ANTONIO, MORTAL SINS:
SEX, CRIME, AND THE ERA OF THE CATHOLIC SCANDAL 334-35 (2013) (stating that Megan Peterson, a
victim, went with Pamela Spees to The Hague and several other press conferences). This was followed by
othor efforts that drow attention to the filing, including numerous additional press reloaso and advocacy
pieces. See, e.g., Press Release, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, September 13 Marks One-Year Anniversary
of International Criminal Court Filing on Vatican Officials for Crimes Against. ITunianily (Sept. 13, 201.2),
http://www.ccrjustice.org/homd,/press-center/prcss-releases/septiembei-13-iaiks-on-ycLat-ami lversary-
ne o1in.'!1.a-criminal (providing an update one year after the original filing). The followhig year, the CCR
submitted yet another public filing. See Letter Supplementing ICC Communication, supra note 117.
130. Abuse Victims Seek Court Case Against Pope, supra note 127 (quoting CCR attorney Pam Spees).
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blogosphere.1 3 ' Significantly, most of these appraisals viewed the investigation request
as destined to fail not because of political or other extraneous considerations. Rather,
it was commonly observed that the relevant offenses fell short of the ICC's statutory
requirements for crimes against humanity. 13 2 In addition, some experts pointed out
that much of the conduct at issue predated the Court's temporal jurisdiction.13 ' Before
engaging with these critiques, then, it makes sense to consider these necessary
prerequisites for the Court's jurisdiction over crimes against humanity.
A. Certain Threshold Requirements for ICC Action
As a starting point, the Court's temporal jurisdiction is prospective. Accordingly,
the ICC may only consider matters that have occurred on or after July 1, 2002, the date
upon which the Court's Statute entered into force.134 In addition, the ICC may only
consider conduct that falls within its designated subject matter jurisdiction." With
respect to crimes against humanity, the Court's Statute bestows jurisdiction only when
any one of an extensive list of prohibited acts (which include rape and torture) is
committed "as part of a widespread or systemic attack directed against a civilian
population."'"N Moreover, the word "attack" is a legal term of art. In order to establish
an "attack," the Statute requires both the "multiple commission of [prohibited] acts"
against a civilian population and that these offenses were committed "pursuant to or
in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack."'
131. "I don't know if this is the most ludicrous thing I've seen, but I certainly don't expect it to go
anywhere. . .. " Kevin Jon Heller, Response to Can the Vatican Be Subject to ICC Prosecution?, OPINIO
JURIS (Sept. 13, 2011, 8:10 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2011/09/13/can-the-vatican-be-subject-to-icc-
prosecution/ [hereinafter Heller, Response]; see also Francis X. Rocca, Victims Say Criminal Charges
Against the Pope Not a Stunt, USA TODAY (Sept. 14, 2011), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/religion/
story/2011-09-13/pope-sexual-abuse/50389998/1 (citing Italian professor Giorgio Sacerdoti's conclusion that
"[t]here will be no follow up" to the filing which will instead "be set aside"); Mac McClelland, Putting the
Pope on Trial, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.motherjones.com/rights-stuff/2011/09/pope-
vatican-sex-abuse-trial (opining that "it's extremely unlikely this complaint, one of many thousands the ICC
has received, is going anywhere").
132. See, e.g., Julian Ku, Can the Vatican Be Subject to ICC Prosecution?, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 13, 2011),
http://opiniojuris.org/2011/09/13/can-the-vatican-be-subject-to-icc-prosecution/ (concluding that the filing
suffered from "massive jurisdictional issues ... as well as substantive issues related to the ICC's
jurisdiction"); Dov Jacobs, The ICC Should Resist Its "Boy Scout Mentality" in Relation to Vatican "Crimes
Against Humanity" for Child Abuse, SPREADING THE JAM (Sept. 15, 2011), http://dovjacobs.com/2011/09/
(pointing out the limits of the Court's temporal jurisdiction and noting that the communication "fails to
convince" regarding the substantive requirements for crimes against humanity).
133. See, e.g., Abuse Victims Urge ICC to Prosecute the Pope, RADIO NETH. WORLDWIDE (Sept. 13,
2011), https://www.rnw.org/archive/abuse-victim-urge-icc-prosecute-pope (reporting Goran Sluiter's
opinion that temporal jurisdiction was doubtful); Paddy Agnew, Abuse Victims File Complaint Against Pope
with Criminal Court in The Hague, IRISH TIMES (Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.irishtimes.com/news/abuse-
victims-file-complaint-against-pope-with-criminal-court-in-the-hague-1.598547 (reporting that
"[c]ommentators said that it was unlikely the court would take on this case, given many of the crimes took
place before 2002").
134. Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 11(1).
135. Id. art. 5.
136. Id. art. 7(1). In addition, the perpetrator of the act must know that his conduct is part of a
widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population. Id.
137. Id.
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B. Temporal Jurisdiction Problems?
Given the limits placed on the Court's temporal jurisdiction, it is perhaps of little
surprise that some have identified the Vatican-targeted communication as potentially
problematic. Indeed, while there is substantial evidence that children and other
vulnerable persons were sexually abused by Catholic clergy members on a massive
scale, the overwhelming majority of this information relates to conduct that occurred
before the ICC became operational in mid-2002."' This timing is particularly
interesting as, at least in the United States, 2002 marked a turning point for the Church
with respect to its handling of sexual abuse claims.13 9 That year, press coverage on the
issue surpassed anything previously seen when reports surfaced that U.S. bishops "had
shuffled accused abusers from parish to parish without informing the police or
public."1 " What followed was a number of reform efforts, including the June 2002
adoption of the Charter for the Protection of Children and Young People,14' a
document whose requirements include prompt response mechanisms for allegations
of sexual abuse, mandatory reporting to public authorities, and cooperation with
consequent investigations.1 42  While implementation of the Charter has been
inconsistent at best,143 a flaw unfortunately shared by comparable reforms adopted
abroad,'" presumably these efforts have nevertheless pared down the number of clergy
sex offenses over which the Court might potentially have jurisdiction. 14' Even more
critically, as the following Part demonstrates, these reform endeavors (and the
apologies that accompanied them) contribute to the communication's subject matter
jurisdiction deficiency.
138. See, e.g., CCR September Filing, supra note 117, at 8-31 (providing an overview of the abuse in
residential schools in Canada, the last of which closed in 1996; discussing reports generated in Ireland that
covered events that took place between 1962 and 2002, 1914 and 2004, 1974 and 2004, and 1996 and 2009;
and describing numerous investigations in the United States, all but one of which were launched in 2002 and
2003).
139. "News stories about instances of clergy sexual abuse had been trickling out for decades, but not
until 2002 did the abuse scandal become a major national story." The Pope Meets the Press: Media Coverage
of the Clergy Abuse Scandal, PEw RES. CTR. (June 11, 2010), http://www.pewforum.org/2010/06/11/the-
pope-meets-the-press-media-coverage-of-the-clergy-abuse-scandal/ (noting that once a U.S. newspaper ran
a series on the topic, it "triggered an avalanche of reporting on sexual abuse by priests in the United States").
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., Laurie Goodstein & Sam Dillon, Bishops Set Policy to Remove Priests in Sex Abuse Cases,
N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/15/national/15BISH.html?pagewanted=all
(describing the new policy to combat the alleged abuses).
142. U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, CHARTER FOR THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AND
YOUNG PEOPLE, arts. 2, 4 (2002), http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/child-and-youth-protection/
upload/Charter-for-the-Protection-of-Children-and-Young-People-revised-2011.pdf.
143. See, e.g., Stacy St. Clair et al., Priest Cases Show Abuse Issues Persist, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 7, 2013),
http://articles.chicagotribuno.com/2013 04 07/news/ct met secret priest-files-20130407 1_priest-cases-
joliet-diocese-personnel-records (noting that records obtained by the newspaper contradicted Charter
promises and providing several examples, including an instance of a priest who continued parish work for
four years after the passage of the Charter, despite previous and numerous accusations of his inappropriate
behavior with young boys).
144. For example, the Irish Bishop's Conference agreed in 1996 on a set of procedures to govern
allegations of clerical child sexual abuse. Commission of Investigation, Report into the Catholic Diocese of
Cloyne, para. 1.16 (2011). These guidelines, however, "were not fully or consistently implemented." Id.
para. 1.17.
145. See Charter for the Protection of Children and Young People, DIOCESE OF WILMINGTON,
http://www.cdow.org/abuse-report.html (last visited June 13, 2016) (chronicling the ways in which the
diocese had complied with the Charter and the likely results of this compliance).
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C. Substantive Jurisdiction Problems
Indeed, even assuming that the clergy sex offenses committed since July 1, 2002
are of a scale that might be deemed "widespread,"' this fact alone is insufficient to
support a charge of crimes against humanity at the ICC. Rather, these crimes will only
fall within the Court's jurisdiction if they were committed as part of an attack against
a civilian population, 1 47 which the Statute defines as "a course of conduct involving the
multiple commission of acts [such as rape] against any civilian population, pursuant to
or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack."'1 In other
words, "[a]n aggregate of crimes by individuals acting on their own initiative do not
amount to an 'attack."' 14 9  Rather, there must be "an element of planning or
direction""se and, as ICC case law makes clear, "the policy to carry out the attack
against the civilian population must be attributed to a State or an organisation."..
What is more, this policy requirement takes on even greater significance when
read in conjunction with the ICC's Elements of Crimes, 5 2 a statutorily recognized
146. "Widespread," as defined in ICC jurisprudence, requires crime commission on a large scale:
"massive, frequent, carried out collectively with considerable seriousness and directed against a multiplicity
of victims." Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and
(b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, para. 83
(June 15, 2009). The Vatican-targeted communications also allege systematicity, which ICC case law has
defined in part as "an organised plan in furtherance of a common policy." Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-
01/04-01/07-717, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, para. 397 (Sept. 30, 2008). Some scholars lean
towards equating the term "systematic" in Article 7 with the "policy" requirement that appears in the
provision. See, e.g., Roger S. Clark, History of Efforts to Codify Crimes Against Humanity: From the Charter
in Nuremburg to the Statute of Rome, in FORGING A CONVENTION FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 8,21
(Leila Nadya Sadat ed., 2011) (opining that "'[p]olicy' (of a state or organization) is pretty close to
systematic"'); see olso Larissa van den Herik, Using Custom to Reconceptualize Crimes Aga ist Humanity,
in JUDICIAL CREATIVITY AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 80, 94 (Shane Darcy & Joseph
Powderly eds., 2010) (concluding that "the policy requirement of Article (7)(2)(a) excludes the possibility
that crimes against humanity are committed as part of an attack that is widespread but not systematic").
Others maintain that the term "systematic" "entails a higher threshold of associative activity and effort to
coordinate crimes" than does the policy requirement. Darryl Robinson, Crimes Against Humanity: A Better
Policy on 'Policy', in THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 41,
at 705, 714 (citing to various authorities); see also Darryl Robinson, Defining "Crimes Against Humanity" at
the Rome Conference, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 50-51 (1999) [hereinafter Robinson, Defining Crimes Against
Humanity] (advancing a similar interpretation). Because this Article finds the policy element lacking, this
negates a finding of systematicity, irrespective of which approach is followed in interpreting the term.
Accordingly, it is not necessary to consider this aspect of the communication's claim.
147. Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 7(1).
148. Id. art. 7(2)(a) (emphasis added).
149. Darryl Robinson, Essence of Crimes Against Humanity Raised by Challenges at ICC, EJIL: TALK!
(Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.ejiltalk.org/essence-of-crimes-against-humanity-raised-by-challenges-at-icc/.
150. Robinson, Defining Crimes Against Humanity, supra note 146, at 48 (noting that the decision to
expressly include the policy element was controversial and part of a necessary compromise).
151. Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/11-656, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Against
Laurent Gbagbo, para. 217 (June 12, 2014) (noting that this is required by Article 7(2)(a) of the Statute);
see also Prosecutor v. Mudacumura, ICC-01/04-01/12-1, Decision on Prosecutor's Application under Article
58, para. 22 (July 13, 2012) (providing that the policy must have "a civilian population as the primary object
of the attack").
152. "The Elements of Crimes impose stricter discipline on the prosecution of ICC crimes than found
only in the Statute." David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course with the International Criminal Court, 35
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 47, 92 (2002).
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document designed to assist the Court in interpreting and applying the Statute's
substantive provisions.153 According to the Elements, the phrase "'policy to commit
such attack' requires that the State or organization actively promote or encourage such
an attack against a civilian population"." The Elements further provide that, in
exceptional circumstances, the policy element can be accomplished by a failure to act,
but only when there is a deliberate omission that "is consciously aimed at encouraging
such attack.""' Considering these provisions in conjunction with the Statute's express
requirement, one sees the drafters' intent to place "a special emphasis on the policy
element."156 Of critical importance for the Vatican-targeted communication, the
combined effect is that crimes directed against the civilian population that are "simply
tolerated or condoned by a state or an organization would not constitute an
attack.... These crimes would therefore not qualify as crimes against humanity under
the Statute."157
This, in turn, leads to the fatal deficiency of the Vatican-targeted filings. At most,
these filings suggest that Church officials (appallingly) accepted and contributed to the
risk of continued clergy offenses while employing a policy aimed at self-preservation.'
Indeed, even Geoffrey Robertson-the first individual to actively make the case for
prosecuting the Pope for crimes against humanity- concedes as much.15 9 In his 2010
book, The Case of the Pope, Robertson acknowledges that "[i]t could never be said
153. Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 9 (dictating the requirements for adoption and amendments and
mandating that the document's provisions be consistent with the Statute).
154. INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, art. 7, para. 3 (2002) [hereinafter ELEMENTS OF
CRIMES] (emphasis added).
155. Id. at 5 n.6 (expressly providing that the policy requirement "cannot be inferred solely from the
absence of any governmental or organizational action"). As Ambos points out, the state or organization
must also have a duty to act, and the ability to protect against the attack, before it can be liable for this
omission. 2 KAI AMBOS, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE CRIMES AND SENTENCING
71 (2014).
156. 1 KAI AMBOS, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: FOUNDATIONS AND GENERAL
PART 281 (2013).
157. Paola Gaeta, War Crimes and Other International 'Core' Crimes, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 737, 756 n.59 (Andrew Clapham & Paola Gaeta eds., 2014)
(emphasis added). Cassese uses very similar language in his book. ANTONIO CASSESE ET AL., CASSESE'S
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 106-07 (3d ed. 2013) (noting that the Rome Statute's requirements are
more stringent than is dictated by customary international law and criticizing the requirement by asking,
"[wiould it not be sufficient for the practice to be accepted, or tolerated, or acquiesced in by the state or the
organization, for those offences to constitute crimes against humanity?"). Grover appears to misunderstand
this quoted language, however, by interpreting it as a call for broadening the reach of the crime under the
Rome Statute. LEENA GROVER, INTERPRETING CRIMES IN THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 276-77 (2014).
158. See, e.g., CCR September Filing, supra note 117, paras. 183-84. Similarly, an investigation
conducted in Ireland concluded that incidents of sexual abuse "were managed primarily with a view to
protecting the Congregation and the Institution from the harm that would be done if [it] became
public.... The policy facilitated further abuse when offenders were transferred within the Congregation or
permitted to leave in good standing." COMM'N TO INQUIRE INTO CHILD ABUSE, 1 THE COMMISSION
REPORT: ST JOSEPH'S INDUSTRIAL SCHOOL, ARTANE ('ARTANE'), 1870-1969, para. 7.845(3) (2009),
http://www.childabusecommission.ie/rpt/pdfs; see also Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding
Observations on the Second Periodic Report of the Holy See, para. 29, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/VAT/CO/2 (Feb.
25, 2014) (observing that "in dealing with allegations of child sexual abuse, the Holy See has consistently
placed the preservation of the reputation of the Church and the protection of the perpetrators above the
child's best interests").
159. GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, THE CASE OF THE POPE: VATICAN ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS ABUSE 143 (2010).
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that the Pope or [other Church officials] were active in encouraging sex
abuse ... however much they should have been aware that 're-assigning' paedophiles
was a green light for re-offending". 64 In fact, Robertson ultimately responded to the
many legal experts who criticized his campaign as doomed to fail under the Rome
Statute... by noting "common ground" between him and his critics, "especially over
the difficulty under the chapeau of Article 7 of the Rome Statute as a result of those
meddlesome 'Elements of Crime."'
1 62
Accordingly, it is of little surprise that the Vatican-targeted communications-
submitted shortly after Robertson's well-publicized campaign -suffered similar
criticism, with multiple legal experts quickly concluding that the conduct that forms
the basis of the Vatican-targeted communications falls outside of the ICC's
competence. 1 63  Yet, just as Robertson's provocative newspaper editorials and
associated efforts'6 successfully "generated enormous media coverage,"06 so has the
campaign attached to the Vatican-targeted communications. And, just as it was
speculated that -jurisdictional deficiencies notwithstanding -Robertson's endeavor
could "be a useful PR exercise" rather than something that would bring about legal
160. Id. (emphasis removed). Robertson goes on to blame the Elements of Crimes as the real
impediment to prosccutiug the Pope and then Llaims that the heightened policy requieienwt found ini tIhe
Elements "water[s] down" the Statute's provisions regarding command responsibility. Id. at 143-44. This
second claim is erroneous, however, as it links two unrelated matters. Command responsibility, as a mode
of liability, is an irrelevant consideration unless and until the Court has subject matter jurisdiction. It is this
latter issue that the Eleient5 address, by assisting the Couit in its interpretation and application of the
Statute's provision on crimes against humanity. As Jacobs notes, the CCR tiling suffers from a similar flaw.
Jacobs, supra note 132 (explaining that modes of liability are "'subsidiary' to the nain crime, which still hqq
to be constituted").
161. See, e.g., Dapo Akande, Questioning the Statehood of the Vatican, EJIL: TALK! (Sept. 15, 2010),
http://www.cjiltalk.org/questioning the statehood-of-the-vatican/ (noting it would be "difficult to argue"
that there was an attack directed against the civilian population); Marko Milanovic, Comment to Can the
Pope Be Sued? Maybe ... , OPINJIO JURIS (Apr. 3, 2010, 7:42 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2010/04/03/can
the pope be sued maybe/ (opining that it was "dubious in the extreme that the actual crimes in question can
be qualified as crimes against humanity" particularly because of the ICC's policy element); Jordan J. Paust,
Comment to Can the Pope Be Arrested in Connection with the Sexual Abuse Scandal?, EJIL: TALK! (Apr.
14, 2010, 7:32 PM), http://www.ejiltalk.org/can-the-pope-be-arrested-in-connection-with-the-sexual-abuse-
scandal/ (observing that the "extremely limited definition of crimes against humanity" in the Rome Statute
makes such a prosecution problematic); Marko Milanovic, Yet More on Arresting the Pope, FJ1IL- TA I K
(Apr. 25, 2010), http://www.ejiltalk.org/yet-more-on-arresting-the-pope/ (describing the prospects for
making such a case as "difficult if not impossible").
162. Dapo Akande, Geoffrey Robertson Responds on the Statehood of the Vatican, EJIL: TALK! (Oct.
13, 2010), http://www.ejiltalk.org/geoffrey-robertson-responds-on-the-statehood-of-the-vatican/.
163. See, e.g., Jason Walsh, Why tht ICC Liktly Won't Chaige Pope over Catlolik, Chu, Lit Ste Abwnet,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.comlWorld/Europe/2011/0915/Why-the-
ICC. likoly won t charge pope over Catholic Church-scx abusec (citing British attorney Neil Addison's
conclusion that the conduct alleged did not constitute crimes against humanity); Laurie Goodstein, Abuse
Victims Ask Court to Prosecute the Vatican, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/09/14/worldleurope/14vatican.html (attributing a similar conclusion to Mark Ellis).
164. Geoffrey Robertson, Opinion, Put the Pope in the Dock, GUARDIAN (Apr. 2, 2010),
http://www.theguardian com/commentisfree/libertycentralI2010/apr/02/pope-legal-immunity-interna tiona I-
law; Geoffrey Rrihc nn, Popp Must Answer for Crimes Against Ilumanity: No Legal Innunity - tIh
Vatican Should Feel the Full Weight of International Law, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Apr. 4, 7010),
http://www.smh.com.au/it-pro/pope-must-answer-for-crimes-against-humanity-20100403-rkro.html.
165. Dapo Akande, Can the Pope Be Arrested in Connection with the Sexual Abuse Scandal?, RTIT
TALK! (Apr. 14, 2010), http://www.ejiltalk.org/can-the-pope-be-arrested-in-connection-with-the-sexual-
abuse-scandal/.
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action,'" so has the Article 15 communication venture been deemed "more of an
ethical statement before the international community than a real attempt at a court
case." 6 1 In other words, and as is the general consensus, 66 the Vatican-targeted
investigation request was a strategic communication and, as will be demonstrated, one
whose subject matter jurisdictional deficiency creates unique perception problems for
the Court.
VI. THE PERCEPTION PROBLEMS CREATED BY IGNORING THE POT ICY
REQUIREMENT
A. Decontextualizing Crimes Against Humanity
Because there is no evidence to indicate that Church officials actively promoted
or encouraged an attack against its most vulnerable members, nor indeed that there
was a Church policy to commit such an attack, these necessary conditions for the Rome
Statute's definition of crimes against humanity are simply not addressed in the media
campaign associated with the Vatican-largeted communication. In fact, rather than
acknowledge the ICC requirement of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against a civilian population, the relevant press releases instead refer to "the systematic
and widespread concealing of rape and child sex crimes."" 9 This, coupled with other
statements, such as that "[t]he jurisdiction of the ICC includes rape, sexual violence,
and torture as crimes against humanity,""o suggests that multiple ordinary crimes are
sufficient to invoke the Court's jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the Vatican-targeted effort - presumably inadvertently - employs a
technique long embraced by Court opponents in their quest to create alarm about the
reach of the ICC. Indeed, in bids to engender concerns about "an activist Court and
Prosecutor ... broaden[ing] the Statute's language in an essentially unchallengeable
fashion,"' ICC adversaries routinely uncouple the underlying crimes from the
contextual elements required for crimes against humanity One example of this is in
John Bolton's 1998 congressional testimony in which he attacks the Statute's provision
166. Marko Milanovic, Comment to Even More on Legal Action Against the Pope: It Looks Like it Will
Happen, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 14, 2010, 6:15 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2010/04/13/even-more-on-legal-
action-against-the-pope-it-looks-like-it-will-happen/.
167. Walsh, supra note 163 (quoting University of Westminster Professor David Chandler),
168. See, e.g., Heller, Response, supra note 131 (concluding that the filing was "clearly designed to raise
th. profile of the systematic abusc"); Ku, supra note 132 (concluding that the "CCR has already gotten most
of what they want out of this filing, in terms of media coverage and public awarcncss"). Similarly, Mark
Ellis, Exceutive Director of the International Dar Association, noted that the CCR allegations did not seem
to fit the ICC definition of Crimes against Humanity, and that the CCR's request for an investigation was
not in line with "why and how the I.C.C. was created," but that "the filing does something that's important.
It raises awareness." Goodstein, supra note 163.
169. First September 2011 Press Release, supra note 1; Press Release, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights,
Major Human Rights Report Affirms that Sexual Abuse by the Clergy is "Torture, Inhuman and Degrading
Treatment," (Sept. 26, 2011), http://www.ccrjustice.org/home/press-center/press-releases/major-human-
rights-report-affirms-sexual-abuse-clergy-torture.
170. Press Release, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, Embattled Clergy Sex-Abuse Survivors Submit New
Evidence to International Criminal Court (Apr. 11, 2012), https://ccrjustice.org/home/press-center/press-
releases/embattled clergy sex abuse survivors submit new evidence.
171. Bolton Statement, supra note 79, at 59.
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on crimes against hum-nanity for including "[o] ther inhumane acts of a similai chat acter
intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical
health."21 7 Describing the language as "vague and elastic," Bolton paints a concerning
picture about the unlucky President who "guesses wrong" regarding what constitutes
an inhumane act.17 ' Designedly missing from this doomsday scenario, however, is the
fact that this leader's plight is hardly a sympathetic one, as criminal liability could only
be incurred at the ICC if there were in fact a state policy in place to commit an attack
against a civilian population. Consequently, by similarly disregarding the Statute's
contextual requirements, which were designed to create a "reasonably high threshold"
for such crimes,""' the Vatican-targeted effort creates the problematic impression that
the Court's subject matter jurisdiction is far broader than it actually is.
Indeed, by failing to note the Statute's requirement of an attack against a civilian
population and instead asserting that there are "two crimes: the rape or sexual violence
committed by individual clergy and then the cover-ups ... by church officials in the
aftermath,"'7 1 the publicity campaign makes credible other-and potentially even
more damaging-claims made against the ICC. In particular, this disaggregation
suggests-wrongly-that critics are correct in maintaining that it is "bit deceptive" to
state that the Court's reach is limited to its four core crimes. 7 6
All this, of course, creates a misleading picture of the ICC and one that is
consistent with the view made popular by Court oppononts. It also contrasts sharply
with reality and a definition of crimes against humanity whose contextual
requirements expressly include a policy element. As David Scheffer-who led the US
delegation at Rome-explained to Congress, the Statute requires "a magnitude test
for the triggering of charges of crimes against humanity" that would enable the United
States to "easily defeat" any claims made against its forces for these crimes 7 What is
more, it is widely believed that the Statute's policy element-its requirement that the
attack must involve crimes committed against a civilian population pursuant to or in
furtherance of a state or organizational policy-exceeds that which is required for
172. Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 7(1)(k).
173. Bolton Statement, supra note 79, at 60.
174. David J. Scheffer, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, 11 PACE INT'L L. REV. 319, 334
(1999); see nn 01ans Kress, On the Outer Limits of CrimesAgainst Humonity: The Concept of Organization
Within the Policy Requirement: Some Reflections on the March 2010 ICC Kenya Decision, 23 LEIDEN J. INT'L
L. 855, 861 (2010) (noting that "[t]he contextual requirement of crimes against humanity reflects the wish of
states that these ... rather heavy restrictions on their sovereignty only apply in particular instances of human
rights violations").
175. Spees, We've Come to the End, supra note 121.
176. Ronald J. Rychlak & John M. Czarnetsky, Federalism and Separation of Powers: Federalism and
the International Criminal Court, 10 ENGAGE J. FEDERALIST SOC'Y PRAC GROUPS 50, 50 (2009) (asserting
that the Court also has jurisdiction over crimes like forced pregnancy, while failing to acknowledge the
additional requirements for crimes against humanity); Somewhat ironically, both of these authors served as
advisers to the Holy See's delegation at Rome. Id.
177 . T UN Inernatioviul Criminal Courf in ihe U.S National Tere?: Hearing Before the Sub.tirr
On Int'l Operations of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 105th Cong. 17-18 (1998) (prepared statement of
ion. David J. Scheffer) [hereinaftcr "Schcffcr Statcmcnt"] (noting that U.S forces are not trained to conunit
crimes against humanity); see also Bartram S. Brown, The Statute of the ICC- Past, Present, and Future, in
THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTFRNATIONAL. LAW 61, 70 (Sarah B, Sewell & Carl Kaysen eds., 2000) (concluding that the Statute's
crimes against humanity provision has a "high jurisdictional threshold [that] goes well beyond the
requirements of general international law").
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crimes against humanity under customary law."' Cassese, for example, lamented the
fact that conduct "simply tolcrated or condoned by a state or an organization would
not constitute an attack," noting that "[c]learly, this requirement goes beyond what is
required under international customary law." 7 9
For Scheffer, this higher threshold provided a useful and compelling counter to
claims that the United States should be fearful of the Court. When asked whether the
ICC placed Americans in danger, Scheffer's "no" answer explained that the United
States could always take steps to preempt Court action,so but that this would only be
necessary "if in fact we have a government that does plot and plan cdines against
humanity.""' Yet those who read the Vatican-targeted communication will be left
with a decidedly different impression: That leaders can be hailed before the Court for
crimes against humanity for policies that don't in fact target the civilian population,
but rather that inadvertently contribute to the commission of the underlying crimes.
This is because the communication maintains that the Statute's policy sequirement is
met by Church actions (such as "priest shifting") and inactions "that facilitated,
promoted or otherwise encouraged the attack."1 82 Yet, as noted, establishing an
"attack" under the Rome Statute requires more than simply identifying an
organizational policy that may enable the commission of the underlying crimes.18
Rather, as the Court's jurisprudence has expressly recognized, "[t]he very language of
the Statute and Elements of Crimes requires that a course of conduct establishing the
existence of an attack be executed 'pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or
organi7ational policy' to attack a civilian population,"
178. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Appeals Chamber rather
famuously adopted a lower (policy-fie) lineshold for crimess gainef huInstity, concluding that W'[a]hes was
nothing in the [ICTY] Statute or in customary international law at the time of the alleged acts which required
proof of the existence of a plan or policy to commit these crimes." Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT 96-
23, IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, para. 98 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002) (noting, in
accompanying footnote 114, "some debate" in Tribunal jurisprudence as to whether a policy or plan is a
roquired element of crimes against humanity under customary international law); see also Gu6nabil
Mettraux, Criimcs Against Humanity in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals for the
Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 237, 271-83 (2002) (adopting the position that
there is no policy requirement for crimes against humanity under customary international law). But see
William A. Schabas, Stuie Policy as an Eluntnt uflIntcrnational Crimes, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 953,
959 (2008) (criticizing the Kunarac decision's conclusion that there is no policy requirement under
customary international law and decrying the accusation as a "results oriented political decision").
179. CASSESE ET AL., supra note 157, at 107.
180. See Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 17(1) (providing that a case is inadmissible at the ICC if it is or
has been the subject of a genuine, domestic investigation or prosecution).
181. THE RECKONING (Renaissance Films 2003).
182. CCR September Filing, supra note 117, para. 183.
183. For example, while a majority of the Pre-Trial Chamber accepted that a policy to punish and expel
civilians from the Rift Vally was mifficaent to meet the iequiiemcnts of Article 7(2)(a), it found that a policy
to gain political power and a uniform voting block "may not aim at committing an attack against the civilian
population" and therefore "falls outside the legal framework of crimos against humanity." Prosecutor v.
Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11-373, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b)
of the Rome Statute, para. 213 (Jan. 23, 2012) (explaining that this political aim might instead provide a
motive or purpose for a policy to commit an attack).
184. Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3436, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, para.
1114 (Mar. 7, 2014) (emphasis added). This aligns with the provision in the Elements of Crimes that
dddicsses policy by omission; a deliberate failure to act may constitute a policy when it is "consciously aimed
at encouraging such an attack." ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 154, at 5 n.6; see also Katanga, ICC-
01/04-01/07-3436, para. 1108 (providing that the term "policy" in Article 7(2)(a) "refers essentially to the
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B. Legitimacy Concerns
Despite this shortcoming in the investigation request, one might nevertheless be
inclined to defend the Vatican-targeted effort as an action that falls within the proper
scope of advocacy. After all, because "law is not always clear and never is static,"
lawyers are generally permitted to argue for its extension or modification -even when
they believe their contentions will ultimately fail-provided that "they can make good
faith arguments in support of their clients' positions.""' Such arguments in this case
could cite to the work of respected jurists that calls for a broad interpretation of Article
7(2)(a)'s policy requirement, including claims that a policy can be established by
demonstrating criminal negligence and recklessness as to the underlying offences '
and even that the policy behind the attack may be met by "tolerance[] or
acquiescence., ,
Notably, however, these broad interpretations of the policy requirement are
difficult (if not impossible) to harmonize with the explicit language of the Statute. For
example, the latter expressly requires the commission of multiple, prohibited acts
"pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such
attack," with "such attack" referring to the immediately preceding language of an
"[a]ttack directed against the civilian population" (emphasis added).' As Groome
rightly points out, "the phrase 'directed against' denotes something purposeful-not
accidental." 1 89 Accordingly, the argument that a policy that negligently or recklessly
contributes to the commission of the underlying crimes could satisfy the requisite
statutory threshold completely contradicts the ordinary meaning of this statutory
language.'" By the same token, while a policy to commit an attack against a civilian
population could certainly be effectuated by deliberate inaction,19 1 the same cannot be
said of a policy that merely tolerates or acquiesces in the commission of the underlying
crimes. While reprehensible, neither negligence, recklessness, tolerance, nor
acquiescence fulfills the express statutory requirement of a state or organizational
policy to commit an attack directed against the civilian population.
fact that a State or organisation intends to carry out an attack against a civilian population"). Similarly, the
decision refers to "State[s] or organisation[s] seeking to encourage an attack against the civilian population."
Id. para. 1109. In addition, ICC jurisprudence has interpreted the phrase "directed against" a civilian
population to mean "that the civilian population must be the primary object of the attack." Prosecutor v.
Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on
the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, para. 76 (June 15, 2009).
185. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCT r. 3.1 cmt. (2014). The relevant rule provides, in pertinent
part: "A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there
is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an
extension, modification or reversal of existing law." Id. r. 3.1.
186. Dermot Groome, The Church Abuse Scandal: Were Crimes Against Hunanity Committed?, 11 CIII.
J. INT'L L. 439, 464 (2011).
187. 2 AMBOs, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 155, at 72.
188. Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 7(2)(a).
189.. Groome, supra note 186, at 462.
190.. "A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, art. 31(1), May 23,1969,1155 U.N.T.S 331.
191.. Indeed, the Elements of Crimes recognize as much by noting that, in exceptional cases, the policy
requirement may be met by "a deliberate failure to take action vhich is consciously aimed at encouraging
such attack." ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 154, at 5, n.6.
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Critically then, these shortcomings point to a distinct difference between what
constitutes ethically permissible legal advocacy and what is good for the Court.
Indeed, in order for the ICC to enjoy normative legitimacy, it must have the "right to
rule,"'92 something that would be lacking should the Court extend its subject matter
jurisdiction beyond the boundaries delineated in its agreed-upon Statute. As a result,
advocating a move in this direction empowers ICC opponents in their dire predictions
of an activist court with unchallengeable and unlimited jurisdiction." 3 This, in turn,
runs the risk of undermining the ICC's perceived or sociological legitimacy, creating
questions about whether the Court can be trusted to adhere to its constitutive
document."4
Thus far, then, we have noted a series of perception problems stemming from the
Vatican-targeted communication's subject matter jurisdictional shortcomings, the
substance of which varies depending upon the relevant audience's familiarity with the
Court's Statute. Those unacquainted with the Rome Statute's provisions will be apt
to conclude that there are almost no limits to the Court's jurisdiction and that leaders
may be called to account for crimes against humanity irrespective of their connection
to the commission of the underlying crimes. By contrast, those conversant with the
Statute's language will be apt to question the ICC's fidelity to the language negotiated
and then agreed upon in Rome, prompting questions about the new institution's
normative and sociological legitimacy.
C. Additional Costs
While the above discussion introduces some new problems created by the
Vatican-targeted effort, it also bears noting the ways in which the campaign specifically
contributed to a number of the general costs of strategic communications identified
earlier in this work. First among these observations is that the strategic
communication created unnecessary work for the ICC's chronically underfunded
OTP, which attributed the two-year delay between the first communication and its
ultimate rejection to the necessity for "meaningful review."'" In addition, the highly
publicized September 2011 submission created a host of intangible costs for the Court
stemming from the decision to describe the communication as a "complaint"'" that
"Charges Vatican Officials with 'Crimes Against Humanity."'197 This fostered the
192.. Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 46, at 405.
193.. See, e.g., Bolton Statement, supra note 79, at 59 (maintaining in addition that the ICC "is-most
emphatically-not a Court of limited jurisdiction").
194.. See, e.g., Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 46, at 407 (noting that this a critical component for
securing the state support necessary for the Court's long-term success); see also Bodansky, supra note 45, at
709-10 (noting that state support for an institution is dependent upon "whether they trust it to make good
decisions").
195. Rejection Letter, supra note 19. It also bears noting that the use of limited resources to address
strategic investigation requests contributes to the glacial pace of the ICC process, a marked source of post-
operational criticism for the ICC. See, e.g., Elizabeth Rubin, If Not Peace, Then Justice, N.Y. TIMEs (Apr.
2, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/02/magazine/02darfur.html?pagewanted=print&_r-0
(concluding that the ICC's work is being conducted "[s]lowly, too slowly for some").
196. SNAP v. the Pope, et al, supra note 124. See, e.g., Press Release, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights,
Dutch Commission Report Highlights Need for International Response to Clergy Sex Abuse (Dec. 16,
2011), http://www.ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-releases/dutch-commission-report-highlights-need-
international-response-clergy-sex-abuse (stating that the CCR had filed a "complaint" against the pope).
197. ICC Vatican Prosecution, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS. (Sept. 13, 2011), http://ccrjustice.org/
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impression both that the Court's jurisdiction has been successfully invoked and that
external actors -specifically, members of civil society-have the ability to bring
charges at the Court without any type of internal vetting process. Moreover, by
making it seem as though specific individuals were facing ICC charges, with media
commentary and headlines in turn propagating this mistake,'" the Court was made to
appear as a forum that affords the "unseemly prospect" of targeting specific
individuals and the opportunity to manipulate its docket in order to "settle scores."200
Even more problematically, by successfully creating these misimpressions, the effort
suggests that critics were right to worry about Court action making "dramatic news,"
irrespective of the merits of the matter at issue or its eventual outcome.201
Perhaps the most troubling consequences of the Vatican-targeted campaign,
however, stem from the misperceptions created for the victims of clergy sexual abuse.
By fostering the impression that there were (or would be) ICC cases directed against
the former Pope and other high-level Vatican officials, victims were presented with
the false hope of accountability for the church figures who, quite reprehensibly, failed
to protect them from harm. This re-victimization is not only disconcerting, but also
creates worrying aftereffects for the Court, as victims are likely to believe that the ICC
is to blame for the fact that the relevant prosecutions have failed to materialize. In
fact, the CCR specifically directed the world to draw this conclusion, maintaining in a
press release that "if [this case] doesn't go anywhere, it will not be because the ICC
lacks jurisdiction over these crimes or the men involved; it will be due to a lack of
political will to adhere to the principle that no one should be held above or beyond the
law."202 Then later, after being informed that the ICC "complaint" had been rejected,
victims of clergy sexual abuse were specifically told that this was not because -as
explained in detail above, and as OTP expressly noted in its May 2013 rejection of the
Vatican targeted communication-"[s]ome of the allegations described in [the]
ICCVaticanProsecution.
198. In fact, the author of the CCR communication told attendees of a May 2012 symposium about "a
case we [the CCR] brought against Joseph Ratzinger, now known as Pope Benedict XVI." Pam Spees,
Surfacing Rhonda, 15 CUNY L. REv. 309, 310 (2012).
199. Multiple media reports referred to the "case" against the Pope, while others misreported that
Vatican officials had been charged. See, e.g., Mike Corder & Rachel Zoll, Clergy Sex Abuse Victims File
International Court Case Against Pope, WORLD POST (Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2011/09/13/clergy-sex-abuse-victims-court-n_959626.html (stating that SNAP was "pursuing the case");
Child Abuse Victims Sue Pope for Crimes Against Humanity, DAILY NATION (Sept. 13, 2011),
http://www.nation.co.ke/News/world/Child+abuse+victims+sue+Pope+for+crimes+against+humanity++/-
/1068/1235856/-/1277ncn/-/index.html (quoting Pam Specs as stating that Vatican officials had been "charged
in this case"); Karen McVeigh, Pope Benedict Resigns: Sex Abuse Survivors Hope Move Eases Prosecution,
GUARDIAN (Feb. 11, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/11/pope-resigns-sex-abuse-
survivors (referring to the "case at the ICC" and the "case [filed] against the pope"); Child Abuse Victims
Accuse Pope of Crimes Against Humanity, ABS CBN NEWS (Sept. 14, 2011), http://news.abs-cbn.com/
global-filipino/world/09/14/11/child-abuse-victims-accuse-pope-crimes-against-humanity (including a quote
from Pam Spees of the CCR discussing "[t]he Vatican officials charged in this case"). Similarly, the CCR
website identifies its ICC campaign as "SNAP v. the Pope, et al." SNAP v. the Pope, et al, supra note 124.
200. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text (discussing the reason why states were not given the
opportunity to file complaints at the Court).
201. Bolton Statement, supra note 79, at 60 (noting that "simply the fact of launching massive criminal
investigations can have an enormous political impact" and citing the U.S. experience with independent
prosecutors as an example).
202. Spees, We've Come to the End, supra note 121.
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communication do not appear to fall within the Court's temporal jurisdiction, and
other allegations do not appear to fall with the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction." 20 3
Rather, SNAP attributed the rejection to the fact that the Catholic Church is an
"ancient and well-entrenched" institution, whereas the ICC is "relatively new and
somewhat overwhelmed., 2 04 What is more, victims continue to be advised to hold out
hope for future ICC action, setting the Court up for further failure in the eyes of this
sector of the international community. These observations, in turn, demonstrate that
significant costs can also be created for the ICC when a strategic communication is
rejected, an issue considered in greater detail in the following Part.
VII. PERCEPTION PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE REJECTION OF THE
COMMUNICATION
A. The Belief that the ICC Will Not Target Western Leaders
It perhaps goes without saying that the aforementioned public accusation that the
Court permits certain figures to commit crimes with impunity creates reputational
harm for the ICC, both in the eyes of victims and the general public. Of even greater
concern for the Court, however, is that members of the international community are
apt to draw this conclusion for themselves, irrespective of their familiarity with the
information provider's claim. This is because, in contrast to pre-operational claims
that the Court would target countries like the United States for political impact, the
ICC in practice has instead been "lenient" towards America 207 and other Western
nations. For example, the Court has been reproached for "sitting on numerous
complaints against Western leaders who are accused of causing untold suffering from
wars they started in the Middle East."2 08 Consequently, the post-operational Court
currently contends with an entirely different criticism than it encountered previously:
That powerful Western figures, like those who lie at the heart of the Vatican-targeted
communication, and who are alleged to bear "direct and superior responsibility for the
crimes against humanity of rape and other sexual violence committed around the
world," 2 n are immune from ICC prosecution. In effect, the sheer fact of the
203. Rejection Letter, supra note 19.
204. Regarding the ICC, Chin Up!, SNAP (June 13,2013), http://www.snapnetwork.org/_regarding-the-
iccchinup (quoting Megan Peterson).
205. "In May 2013, the ICC prosecutor declined to open a full investigation, but indicated they would
reconsider upon submission of new evidence." SNAP v. the Pope, et al, supra note 124. While it is true that
the Rejection Letter indicates that the decision not to proceed may be reconsidered, pursuant to the Court's
Rules, this language must be included whenever a communication is rejected. Rejection Letter, supra note
19; INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EvIDENCE, supra note 108, r. 49(2).
206. Bolton Statement, supra note 79, at 60.
207. International Criminal Court: Let the Child Live, ECONOMIST (Jan. 25, 2007),
http://www.economist.com/node/8599155. This perception may be poised to change. See THE OFFICE OF
THE PROSECUTOR, INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, REPORT ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION, supra note 4, para.
134 (noting that the OTP is continuing its preliminary examination of the situation in Afghanistan, which
includes potential crimes involving U.S. forces).
208. Charles Kazooba, African Legislators See Bias in ICC Workings, E. AFR. (June 7, 2010),
http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/-/2558/932638/-/item/O/-/j8gllvz/-/index.htnil (attributing this
accusation to African parliamentarians).
209. First September 2011 Press Release, supra note 1.
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communication's rejection appears to provide further evidence that "powerful states
[are] able to shield themselves and their clients" from ICC justice.2 10
B. The Belief that the ICC Is Biased Against Africa
Vitally, this observation maps onto what is arguably the most pervasive and
powerful criticism presently directed at the ICC: that the institution operates with an
anti-Africa bias. 2 1  This selective justice claim began its ascent once the Court's docket
became more established, yet exclusively focused on situations in Africa.21 2 The
accusation quickly became part and parcel of media coverage on the Court, prompting
the common defense that the situations then under consideration at the ICC derived
from so-called self-referrals-requests made by African states (at that time, Uganda,
the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic) for the ICC to
conduct investigations on their own territories-and the fourth, the situation in
Darfur, was the result of a UN Security Council referral.213 In other words, the member
states that referred situations on their own territories and the UN Security Council
were responsible for the geographic concentration of investigations and prosecutions,
not the Court.
This message, however, was at least partially undermined with the advent of the
ICC's next investigation, as the first use of the ICC Prosecutor's proprio motu powers
continued to keep the Court in Africa by expanding then-ongoing investigations to
include Kenya.21 4 Yet, "Kenya itself mooted the possibility of ICC investigations"215
and, according to numerous sources, the behind the scenes maneuvering that followed
resulted in a so-called "backdoor referral." 2 16 Nevertheless the perception problem
210. Jendayi Frazer, Commentary, International Courts and the New Paternalism: African Leaders Are
Targets Because Ambitious Jurists Consider Them to Be "Low-Hanging Fruit," WALL ST. J. (July 24, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/international-courts-and-the-new-paternalism-1437778048.
211. See, e.g., Kenneth Roth, Africa Attacks the International Criminal Court, N.Y. REv. (Feb. 6, 2014),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/02/06/africa-attacks-international-criminal-court/ (noting that "in its
eleven-year history, the [ICC] has prosecuted only Africans"); Ugandan Leadcr Calls on Africa to Quit lCC,
AL JAZEERA (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/12/ugandan-leader-calls-africa-
quit-icc-201412121712353977.html (stating that the court "unfairly targets Africans" and that African
nations should pull out of the treaty).
212. Noting that "African leaders have taken note of the ICC's intense interest in their continent," Bosco
points to the charging of al-Bashir as the point at which "[t]he backlash swelled." David Bosco, Why Is the
International Criminal Court Picking Only on Africa?, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-is-the-international-criminal-court-picking-only-on-africa/
2013/03/29/cb9bf5da-96f7-11e2-97cd-3d8clafe4f0tfstory.html [hereinafter Bosco, Picking Only on Africa?].
213. George Lerner, Ambassador: U.S. Moving to Support International Court, CNN (Mar. 24, 2010),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/03/24/us.global.justice/ (quoting a defense of the Court's geographical
concentration put forward by U.S. Ambassador Stephen Rapp); Franny Rabkin, Africa: World Court Faces
Charges of 'Judicial Imperialism,' ALLAFRICA (July 23, 2010), http://allafrica.com/stories/
201007230728.html (dubbing this defense "the self-referral argument," describing it as the "main response"
to bias accusations, and questioning its merit).
214. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-19, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome
Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya (Mar. 31, 2010).
215. Max du Plessis, The African Union, the International Criminal Court and al-Bashir's Visit to Kenya,
INST. FOR SEC. STUD. (Sept. 15, 2010), https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/the-african-union-the-
international-criminal-court-and-al-bashirs-visit-to-kenya.
216. "In fact, the [Kenyan then-] prime minister and the president invited the prosecutor-said,
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continued to worsen, particularly because the ICC's field of then-exclusively African
investigations expanded in response to a Malian self-referral,217 a second UN Security
Council referral, this time involving Libya,2 18 and a request for an investigation on its
territory from non-member, African state Ivory Coast.2 19
All told, allegations of bias against Africa continue to plague the ICC, despite
efforts to combat the notion. For example, U.N. Human Rights Commissioner Navi
Pillay recently pointed out that six of the eight investigations then in play were invited
by the respective African states, with Sudan and Libya the result of UNSC referrals. 0
Moreover, OTP members have taken pains to stress that the office's current field of
preliminary examinations include numerous situations outside of the African
continent221 and, indeed, one such examination lately segued into the Court's first non-
African formal investigation.222 Yet, despite the many efforts to address the anti-
Africa claim, in particular by educating the public about how the Court's jurisdiction
is triggered, the ubiquitous allegation of bias has succeeded in undermining the Court's
perceived legitimacy in numerous quarters. In Kenya, for example, one voter
described the ICC as "a tool of Western countries to manipulate undeveloped
countries."m2' What is more, despite the recent (and limited) geographical expansion
of the Court's investigations, "the anti-ICC zeal of certain African states is showing no
signs of abating." 224 Accordingly, when it is repeatedly emphasized that most non-
'Prosecutor, you do this,' they said, 'we'll refer it to you."' Am. Bar Ass'n Int'l Criminal Court Project,
WICC Cap Hill Briefing With Ambassador Rapp, YOUTUBE (June 17, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?feature=playerembedded&v=OKxzXnHFWuM (comments of Ambassador Stephen Rapp) (noting
that "at the last minute" this position changed to one in which the state instead wished for the Court to
proceed without a referral, but with Kenyan cooperation, such that "it was effectively a situation where the
country brought the ICC in"). As explained by Hassan Omar Hassan, head of the Kenyan National
Commission on Human Rights, a direct self-referral was not feasible because it "would have been a de facto
admission that Kenya is unable to prosecute the perpetrators, and that would have put [it] under the
umbrella of failed states,... [so] the President and the Prime Minister wanted to save themselves from
embarrassment in that regard." Nick Wadhams, After Kenyan Stalling, the ICC Will Investigate Post-
Election Riots, TIME (Nov. 6, 2009), http://content.time.com/time/worldlarticle/0,8599,1935921,00.html.
217. See, e.g., Letter from Malick Coulibaly, Minister of Justice, Republic of Mali, to Prosecutor, Int'l
Criminal Court (July 13, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/A245A47F-BFD1-45B6-891C-
3BCB5B173F57/0/ReferralLetterMalil3O7l2.pdf (referring a case to the ICC).
218. S.C. Res. 1970 (Feb. 26, 2011).
219. See, e.g., D6claration de reconnaissance de la Comp6tence de la Cour P6nale Internationale
[Statement of Recognition of the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court] (Apr. 18, 2003),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/CBE1Fl6B-5712-4452-87E7-4FDDE5DD7OD9/279779/ICDE.pdf
(Cbte d'Ivoire) (recognizing the jurisdiction of the ICC and promising compliance with the investigation);
Letter from Alassana Ouattara, President, C6te d'Ivoire, to the President and Prosecutor, Int'l Criminal
Court (Dec. 14, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/498E8FEB-7A72-4005-A209-C14BA374804F/
0/ReconCPI.pdf (confirming acceptance of ICC jurisdiction).
220. Sible Mlambo, Navi Pillay Defends ICC Role in Africa, IOL NEWS (July 9, 2015),
http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/navi-pillay-defends-icc-role-in-africa-1882972.
221.. See Guariglia & Rogier, supra note 101, at 355 (noting on-going preliminary examinations on
three different continents along with the fact that this diversity "may not be sufficient to persuade skeptical
minds").
222. In January 2016, the Court's launched its first non-African investigation when the ICC Pre-Trial
Chamber authorized the Prosecutor to investigate the situation in Georgia. See Decision on the Prosecutor's
request for authorization of an investigation, supra note 7271.
223.. Bosco, Picking Only on Africa?, supra note 212.
224.. Mark Kersten, Why is the International Criminal Court stepping out of Africa and into Georgia?
JUSTICE IN CoNFLIcr (Feb. 6, 2016) (noting that adding "only one country outside [Africa] won't change
their argument much" and that the new investigation "won't change the view that the court works in the
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African actors are currently left to commit crimes with impunity,m the Court's
rejection of the Vatican-targeted communication appears to substantiate these
concerns of bias. In fact, the rejection prompted this very response, with one
commentator remarking, "Of course it was rejected. The ICC specializes in
Africans."226
C. The Belief that the ICC Ignores Crimes of Sexual Violence
Another potential-and certainly unintentional -consequence of the strategic
communication is that its rejection may mistakenly be seen as evidence that the Court
remains insufficiently committed to prosecuting sexual and gender-based crimes, a
once pervasive and legitimate appraisal of the ICC's early operation. 227 At Rome, the
Women's Caucus for Gender Justice worked to make sure that the Rome Statute
included a gender perspective.2 The resultant Statute is the first ever international
instrument to explicitly recognize sex crimes as underlying crimes for both crimes
against humanity and war crimes.2 As the Court became operational, however, its
first Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, made no use of these innovations. 230 Instead,
his 2005 report to the UN Security Council made little mention of then-widespread
crimes of sexual violence in Darfur, prompting an NGO-generated public call for the
Court to "demonstrate it takes gender crimes seriously."m' At the time, Moreno-
Ocampo was also neglecting his statutory obligation to appoint an adviser on sexual
and gender violence,m2 2 opting to operate without such an adviser for the first five years
favor of Western states").
225.. See, e.g., Reason Wafawarova, ICC and Empty Justice, HERALD (Jun. 18, 2015),
http://www.herald.co.zw/icc-and-empty-justice/ (discussing the impunity of countries such as the United
States and Israel).
226.. Reader comments to Rachel Zoll, Pope Benedict XVI International Criminal Court Investigation
Requested By Clergy Sex Abuse Victims Rejected, HUFFINGTON POST (Jun. 13, 2013) (screen shot on file
with author).
227.. See ICC Must Demonstrate It Takes Gender Crimes Seriously, WOMEN'S INITIATIVES FOR
GENDER JUSTICE (June 30, 2005),
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/WIGJMediaReleaseDarfur3OJun2005.pdf (illustrating instances in
which the ICC did not prosecute gender-based crimes) [hereinafter WOMEN'S INITIATIVES FOR GENDER
JUSTICE].
228.. Janet Halley, Rape at Rome: Feminist Interventions in the Criminalization of Sex-Related Violence
in Positive International Criminal Law, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 22-23 (2009) (concluding that "what the CICC
was to the pro-ICC NGOs, the WCGJ was to the feminist ones"); see also Augustfnyovd & Dumbryte, supra
note 35, at 46-47 (discussing the reasons why the WCGJ was so successful).
229. INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, POLICY PAPER ON SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED CRIMES, para. 1 (2014),
https://www.icc-cpi.intliccdocs/otp/OTP-Policy-Paper-on-Sexual-and-Gender-Based-Crimes-June-
2014.pdf. The Statute's relevant provisions on war crimes and crimes against humanity were "taken almost
verbatim from the proposal of the Women's Caucus." AugustnyovA & Dumbryte, supra note 35, at 47; see
also Sellers, supra note 39, at 313 (describing the Rome Statute's provisions, in comparison to its ad hoc
predecessors, as "legal heaven, replete with dessert").
230. See Meredith Tax, Women Have Human Rights, Too, GUARDIAN (Dec. 13, 2010),
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/dec/13/international-criminal-court-moreno-
ocampo (explaining how "[u]nfortunately, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the ICC's first prosecutor, has shown little
grasp of the statute he is supposed to be enforcing").
231. WOMEN'S INITIATIVES FOR GENDER JUSTICE, supra note 227.
232. Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 42(9).
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of his termn' rather than avail himself of high-level expertise to take on the novel and
important task of "mainstreaming crimes against women." 23 In the absence of such
assistance, Moreno-Ocampo was heavily criticized for failing to include gender-based
charges in what became the Court's first prosecution,2 3 5 with members of civil society
again vocalizing their disappointment that "widespread rape and sexual slavery [were]
crimes ignored by the Court in their [sic] investigations and consequently in the case
against Mr. Lubanga." 236 Moreno-Ocampo's subsequent refusal to amend Lubanga's
charges brought about even more stinging, public criticism, this time from the Trial
Chamber that heard the case.3' At Lubanga's 2012 sentencing hearing-just after the
close of Moreno-Ocampo's term in office-the presiding judge announced in open
court that "[t]he chamber strongly deprecates the attitude of the former Prosecutor in
relation to the issue of sexual violence," a rebuke that was widely reported around the
world.r" Lubanga's conviction also prompted civil society to resurrect its critique of
the narrow charges," alongside a call for the OTP to consider the lessons that could
be learned from its first prosecution and to "review its limited investigations
strategy." 240
To her credit, while still Prosecutor-elect, the current Prosecutor, Fatou
Bensouda, promised a stronger gender policy 2 4 ' and has since evidenced a sincere
233. Niamh Hayes, Investigating and Prosecuting Sexual Violence at the ICC, in THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 41, at 801, 838 (describing the eventual
appointment of Catherine MacKinnon as "largely symbolic").
234. Tax, supra note 230.
235. See, e.g., Letter from Brigid Inder, Exec. Director, Women's Initiatives for Gender Justice, to Luis
Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor, Int'l Criminal Court (Aug. 2006), http://www.iccwomen.org/news/docs/
ProsecutorLetterAugust 2006 Redacted.pdf (expressing "grave concern at the narrow charges being
brought by the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) in the case against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, specifically the
absence of charges for gender based crimes").
236. Joint Press Release, Congolese Coal. for Transitional Justice & Women's Initiatives for Gender
Justice, Failed DRC Investigations by the ICC Claim NGOs (Aug. 31, 2006), http://www.iccnow.org/
documents/PressFailedDRCInvestigationsBylCC 31Aug06_en.pdf.
237. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2901, Decision on Sentence Pursuant to Article 76
of the Statute, para. 60 (July 10, 2012) (" [N]ot only did the former Prosecutor fail to apply to include sexual
violence or sexual slavery at any stage during these proceedings, including in the original charges, but he
actively opposed taking this step during the trial when he submitted that it would cause unfairness to the
accused if he was convicted on this basis.").
238. Id. See generally Michelle Faul, Congolese Warlord Sentenced to 14 Years in Prison, BOSTON
GLOBE (July 11,2012), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2012/07/10/congolese-warlord-sentenced-
years-prison/WiKdNuiqBUtJzUThMiXgAK/story.html; Marlise Simons, International Criminal Court
Issues First Sentence, N.Y. TIMEs (July 10, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/11/world/europe/
international-crininal-court-issues-first-sentence.html?r=0.
239. See, e.g., Rights Groups Hail DR Congo Warlord Conviction, AFR. REV. (Mar. 14, 2012),
http://en.starafrica.com/news/rights-groups-hail-dr-congo-warlord-conviction-222695.html (discussing civil
society's criticism of the failure to prosecute crimes of sexual violence, thereby "deny[ing] justice and
potential reparations to many victims"); David Smith, Congo Child Army Leader Thnmas Lubuna Found
Guilty of War Crimes, GUARDIAN (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/law/2012/mar/14/congo-
warlord-thomas-lubanga-icc (discussing the criticism for the failure to charge Lubanga with sexual violence
crimes).
240. Smith, supra note 239.
241. Statement of Fatou Bensouda, supra note 40. This announcement was clearly welcomed by civil
society. See, e.g., Statements from Civil Society Welcoming Prosecutor Bensouda, COAL. FOR THE INT'L
CRIM. CT. (June 15, 2012), http://www.iccwomen.org/documents/Welcoming-Prosecutor-Bensouda.pdf
(expressing particular support for Bensouda's promise of a stronger gender policy).
316 [VOL. 51:3
THE HIDDEN COSTS OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS
commitment to repairing this damaged aspect of the Court's reputation.2 42 Yet these
advances have arrived after nearly a decade of criticism on the topic and have garnered
only marginal recognition in mainstream media. 243  By contrast, social media
demonstrates a long memory, going so far as to link the rejection of the Vatican-
targeted communication to the Court's troubled history regarding crimes of sexual
violence." Accordingly, the OTP's rejection of the filing could easily be
misinterpreted in this regard, consequently undermining some of the significant and
legitimate strides the second Prosecutor has made regarding the Court's approach to
sexual and gender based crimes.
CONCLUSION
It is difficult to overstate the bond between civil society and the ICC and easy to
understand why members of this group have been classified as "self-perceived
stakeholders" in the institution. 2 45  As we have seen, civil society-in particular
NGOs-played an essential role in the Court's creation, helping to successfully
facilitate negotiations at Rome and leaving a noticeable imprint on the ICC Statute.
Since that time, the group has remained equally vital to the Court's operation, from
early year advocacy measures, including a pivotal ratification campaign, to
contemporary outreach efforts and even providing direct support and training for ICC
staff. These extensive contributions reflect the group's important commitment to the
Court's anti-impunity objective and its aim to deliver justice to "victims of
unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity."246
In light of these priorities, it is not surprising that some ICC supporters have
embraced the prospect of using the Article 15 communication process as a means to
accomplish non-Court related objectives. Critically, well-publicized strategic
communications are liable to generate global awareness of atrocities that might
otherwise pass under the international community's radar. This recognition, in turn,
has the potential to accomplish a host of laudable goals, including the possibility that
intense international pressure will be brought to bear so as to bring an end to harmful
242. See, e.g., Louise Chappell & Rosemary Grey, Forging New Paths for Gender Justice at the
International Criminal Court?, WOMEN, PEACE & SEC. ACAD. COLLECTIVE (Mar. 5, 2014),
https://wpsac.wordpress.com/2Ol4/03/05/forging-new-paths-for-gender-justice-at-the-intemational-
criminal-court/ (concluding that there has been a "marked improvement in the ICC's efforts to address
sexual violence" and that "there is reason to hope that the ICC has learnt important lessons from its initial
failures"); see also THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, STRATEGIC PLAN 2012-
2015, at 3 (2013) (including amongst its strategic goals "enhanc[ing] the integration of a gender perspective
in all areas of our work and continu[ing] to pay particular attention to sexual and gender based crimes").
243. See, e.g., Marlise Simons, International Criminal Court to Focus on Sex Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (June
5, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/06/world/europe/international-criminal-court-to-focus-on-sex-
crimes.html (discussing the adoption of the new policy); Benjamin Durr, ICC Puts 'Rape Campaign'in CAR
on Trial, AL JAZEERA (Nov. 30, 2014), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/11/icc-puts-rape-
campaign-car-trial-201411301063373446.html (acknowledging the importance of the Lubanga decision on
this issue).
244. Stephen Smith Cody (@StephenSCody), TWirrER (June 13, 2013, 2:52 PM), https://twitter.com/
StephenSCody/status/345297600041320449 ("What do Pope Benedict and Lubanga have in common? The
ICC won't try either for crimes of sexual violence.").
245. Keller, supra note 44, at 19.
246. Rome Statute, supra note 5, pmbl.
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conduct. As this work has demonstrated, however, the potential advantages created
by launching a strategic communication cannot be considered in isolation. Rather,
precisely because civil society has a stake in the venture, its members ought not to
engage in the practice before considering the potential effects on the Court.
Some of these considerations are practical in orientation. For example, the fact
that the ICC Office of the Prosecutor is underfunded and already operating at or near
capacity ought to enter into the cost-benefit analysis before using the communication
process instrumentally. If a request is not intended to generate an actual investigation,
is it worth the additional, unnecessary work its submission generates for the OTP? By
the same token, court supporters should bear in mind that the resources dedicated to
processing these submissions are by necessity diverted from other efforts, thereby
inadvertently contributing to the much-maligned glacial pace of ICC operations.
Of even greater importance is the tension this work exposes between what makes
for an effective strategic communication and what is good for the Court. Media
interest will undoubtedly be higher when a press release alleges that a high profile
figure is facing ICC charges than when it more faithfully reports that the Court's
Prosecutor has been asked to consider opening an investigation. Yet, at what cost to
the ICC? In effect, this tactic does the work of Court opponents for them, by creating
the impression that external actors - in particular NGOs - are at liberty to determine
the Court's docket and that they can use this power to target specific individuals. In
fact, these very pieces of misinformation have long held a place in anti-ICC rhetoric
and have enjoyed the benefit of traction precisely because the general public tends to
know so little about the Court.
Notably, the Vatican-targeted communication and its attendant publicity
campaign reinforce these and other misconceptions made popular by those who sought
to undermine the ICC's chances for success. By essentially ignoring the Rome
Statute's contextual requirements for crimes against humanity, the Vatican-targeted
effort suggests both that there are almost no limits to the Court's jurisdiction and that
leaders are at risk of such prosecutions, irrespective of any connection to the
underlying crimes. As established, Court opponents used precisely these misleading
arguments to inspire fear about the ICC's potential reach over U.S. leaders. What is
more, inasmuch as the argument for Vatican leader liability rests on the fact that the
negotiated and agreed upon language for the Court's jurisdiction over crimes against
humanity can be ignored, the campaign buttresses earlier voiced concerns that the ICC
would serve as an activist court with unchallengeable and unlimited jurisdiction.
Perhaps the most troublesome perception problems revealed in this work,
however, are those that stem from the ICC's ultimate rejection of the strategic
communication. Despite the propriety of this resolution, clergy sex abuse victims have
been led to believe a different story, which paints the Court as weak, overwhelmed,
and lacking the necessary will to bring high-level figures to account. This, in turn,
supports troublesome, contemporary allegations that Western leaders are exempt
from ICC prosecution and appears to provide further evidence that the Court is indeed
biased against Africa. What is more, in direct contradiction of recent and important
efforts undertaken by the current Prosecutor, the rejection has resurrected claims that
the ICC is not taking gender crimes seriously.
These troubling (mis)perception problems illustrate why the Vatican-targeted
campaign ought to serve as a cautionary tale for those tempted to submit strategic
communications. In addition to the quantifiable costs of submitting unsustainable
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requests, the potential for intangible harm to the ICC is significant, particularly when
campaigns are driven by NGOs that have the clout and ability to attract international
attention. At a minimum, then, Court supporters ought to be sensitive to the reality
in which the ICC operates and to the long-standing and more recent criticisms that
have shaped the Court's reputation. Pivotally, submitted communications and their
attendant publicity should take care to neither exploit nor inadvertently reinforce
common misperceptions about ICC operations. As the institution struggles to meet
its responsibilities and manage public expectations, civil society ought to adopt
practices that enhance the way the ICC is viewed in the court of public opinion. As
this Article demonstrates, strategic communications run the risk of significantly
undermining this important objective.
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